July 4th on Trial

I want to wish everyone a very happy Fourth of July. I plan to spend my day going to the Nationals game with friends, binging on Freedom Fries, and watching the fireworks over the National Mall. But for this post, I wanted to remember two groups of people who will have an entirely different kind of Fourth of July. Their Fourth of July won’t be about friends, fries, and fireworks. But what they will go through today should remind all of us what the Fourth truly should be about: how lucky we are to live in a free nation.

In Egypt, the political trial against NGOs promoting Egyptian democracy restarts today with high profile testimony from prosecution witnesses. According to Fayza Aboulnaga, the minister who is spearheading the crackdown against the NGOs, the accused organizations were operating without a license and are therefore subject to prosecution. But Freedom House president David Kramer, refutes Aboulnaga’s accusations and argues persuasively that the trial is part of a larger crackdown against civil society by remnants of the Mubarak regime intent on aborting the revolution.  Forty three defendants stand accused, but only a fraction will attend court tomorrow. After months of pressure, the US government convinced the Egyptian authorities to allow the accused Americans to leave the country. The Egyptians remain to face trial, but they won’t do so alone. Robert Becker of the National Democratic Institute refused to abandon his Egyptian colleagues. And Sherif Mansour resigned his position at Freedom House to return to Egypt to face trial in person. He was immediately arrested upon his arrival.

Egyptian Democracy When Pigs Fly

Last week, I went to an event hosted by the Wilson Center that featured Egyptian journalist Heba el-Koudsy discussing American democracy promotion in Egypt. You can see a summary of the event here. Or, for the more visually-inclined, the video is available online here.


During her lecture, el-Koudsy differentiated between external American and internal Egyptian pressure for reform. She argued it has always been the internal push for reform that has prodded President Mubarak into (insufficient) action. As such, the U.S. should focus on ways to support the internal drive for democratization by, for example, bolstering civil society.


At minute 53, I asked her how the potential candidacy Mohamed ElBaradei may provide a new source of internal leverage for reform on the Mubarak regime.

To give a quick background, Egypt will be holding its second-ever multi-party competitive elections for president in 2011. All experts agree that the presidency will remain in Mubarak's hands through manipulation and coercion. The only question is whether it'll be Hosni or his son Gamal who will be the Mubarak in charge.

Enter Elbaradei. Currently, he enjoys broad popularity in Egypt for his service as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. As such, the Wafd party - one of the oldest parties in Egypt and considered an opposition party - asked the historically apolitical ElBaradei to run as their candidate for president.


After mulling it over, ElBaradei announced he would only run in the very unlikely scenario that elections were "free and fair." Shortly after that announcement, he upped the ante again, declaring he would only run as an independent candidate. To translate for you, he basically said he'd run for president when pigs fly.

The Egyptian constitution, while technically allowing independent candidates to run for president, sets an overwhelming number of restrictions and qualifications on an independent candidacy. To give a domestic example, imagine if a candidate declared he/she would only run for president if the electoral college were abolished, and even then, as neither a Democrat or Republican. That's what ElBaradei is doing.

In short, it won't ever happen under the current constitution. And more importantly, everyone - including ElBaradei and Mubarak - know it will never happen. And yet, according to El-Koudsy, something is happening.

Egyptians are no longer only talking about Mubarak versus Mubarak. ElBaradei's announcement has stimulated Egypt's political conscious, sparking new debate and revealing new possibilities. But most importantly, Mubarak's farcical and cynical use of democratic institutions to mask his dictatorship have been laid bare. And that's exactly what ElBaradei sought to achieve by effectively refusing to participate in sham elections.

During his tenure as IAEA chief, he scoured the deserts of Iraq in search for the mythical weapons of mass destruction and negotiated endlessly with the intransigent Iranian regime. Now as an Egyptian politician, he seems to be prepared to put those experiences to good use: to continue chasing fantasy while tirelessly confronting an uncompromising regime.

And if he and other Egyptians persist, maybe one day that fantasy will be fantasy no more.

Arab Israeli Women At Work

As explained by Himmat Zoabi in Haaretz, Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz recently sought to explain high unemployment amongst Arab Israeli women. Citing low female employment across the Arab world, Minister Steinitz partially blamed conservative Arab culture.

However, Zoabi argues that this argument obscures a more important truth. Namely, not only do Arab Israeli women work less than other Israeli women, but they even suffer from higher unemployment than woman in other Arab countries. According to Zoabi, 21.1% of Arab Israeli women are employed compared to 51.3% of all Israeli women. Meanwhile, 29% of Saudi women, 27% of Omani women and 42% of Moroccan women are employed.

The question, therefore, is, "why do fewer Arab women have jobs in Israel than Saudi Arabia?"

Zoabi primarily blames the Israeli government and its "policy of deliberate and consistent discrimination against Arab citizens." Specifically, compared to their Jewish counterparts, Arab villages have insufficient access to public transportation and employment training programs. Furthermore, Zoabi cites:

the shortage of day-care centers in Arab towns (of 1,600 day-care centers for children under 3 that receive government assistance, only 25 operate in Arab communities) and government-supported industrial zones (only 3.2 percent are in Arab areas). In addition, Arab women constitute a mere 3 percent of civil servants, even though the civil service is the largest employer of women in Israel.

Importantly, Zoabi does not dismiss the problems posed by Arab culture, but urges the government to "leave the social barriers to us." And, in fact, I have personally seen the efforts undertaken by Arab Israeli women to make a better life for themselves and their families. During a recent trip to Israel, I visited the women of the Sharikat Haya program, which trains Arab women and helps find them employment. Specifically, the women learn a range of practical skills, such as how to write a resume and use a computer, as well as Hebrew language courses.

But the truly inspiring part comes from listening to their stories. Most of them are under the age of 25, already have at least one child, and have decided to attend the program against the better judgement of their spouses. They are driven. They want to help their families. And they seek to discover their potential.

Importantly, the funding for Sharikat Haya comes from the Abraham Fund Initiatives that "seeks civic equality for Israel's Jewish and Arab Citizens as a moral and pragmatic imperative." Therefore, significant amounts of the financial support (I'm sorry but I can't read Hebrew to be certain of exact numbers) comes from the Jewish community. And that's great, the more the better.

But at the same time, we cannot neglect the other half of the problem that Zoabi outlines. For to truly solve the problem of high female unemployment, we need to tackle all its aspects - political, cultural, economic, linguistic, pragmatic - all at once.

Since 1989, Israeli's GDP/capita has more than quadrupled, but it has done so by and large without the participation of its Arab minority, both male and female. Imagine what might happen if the Israeli government addressed even half the issues Zoabi identifies. Imagine what might be accomplished if 20% of the Israeli population finally began to fully contribute. And imagine the implications for peaceful coexistance and, yes, even cooperation.