My trip to Lebanon

I just spent the past week in Lebanon interviewing journalists covering Syria and Lebanon. I'll be writing something more formal about my findings shortly. But in the meantime, here are a few quick general observations about my trip, which was book cased by two bombings against Hezbollah targets.

1. There is widespread anxiety and even a sense of inevitability that the Syrian war will spill into Lebanon. There is always sufficient tinder in Lebanon, and sparks are flying all over the place from both local and international actors. Not only has the war in Syria escalated sectarian tensions in Lebanon, but Syrian rebels have a clear interest in provoking a fight in Lebanon to force Hezbollah fighters in Syria to return home to defend against local enemies. I don't want to exaggerate this anxiety. Lebanon has balanced precariously for years now, and they've somehow managed so far. But the anxiety is more pronounced now because the risk is more difficult to manage.
2. As tensions rise, journalists are at a significant risk of beatings and illegal detentions by non-state actors, especially Hezbollah. This has always been a problem in Lebanon, especially as journalists associated with one political camp try to report on events in territories controlled by another camp. But enhanced political tensions and the fear of violence will make it that much worse, especially as security forces grow more paranoid about infiltrators and saboteurs. International journalists will also be at risk of being accused as spies or worse. More on this later.
3. It will also become increasingly dangerous for those who seek independence from Lebanon's rigid political camps. The Lebanese government is both unwilling and unable to protect its citizens. Protection comes through membership in a political camp. But the Lebanese who seek to bridge divides, who seek to upend the sectarian system, who criticize all sides, will do so at their own risk. 
4. Despite the fear of violence, Christian areas of Lebanon remain party happy as ever. It reminds me a lot of 2006, where night clubs remained open as Israeli bombs fell on Hezbollah territory. It'd be a mistake, however, to think Christians can emerge unscathed if tensions between Sunni and Shia escalate to violence. If the Syrian war does spill over, the violence will not be so isolated as 2006 and it will be hard for Christians to stay above the fray. So perhaps they have Isaiah 22:13 in mind.
5. Electricity outages are far more frequent than I remember from my last trip four years ago. My electricity was cut off a dozen times a day, even though I was staying in affluent areas. My friend told me he had power in his apartment for 12 hours a day. This is but one example of how the government is failing to govern. 
6. Finally, one non sequitur from the airport. As a customs official was checking my passport, a man and his wife came behind me in line.The official looked up and started to repeatedly yell at the man, "What do you have?! Drugs?!" He then let loose a smirk and explained to me, "They're Iraqi." After passing through the metal detector, I lingered behind to make sure the couple was okay. After 10 minutes of what seemed like heated discussion and gesticulating, the man reached out and kissed the official on the cheek. The couple then passed through the metal detectors without harassment. 

UPDATE: I forgot to add one more anecdote. I stayed at a largely vacant Ramada in downtown for...$65 a night. Not a good sign for tourism and business. Admittedly, my flight to Beirut was relatively full, but it seemed to be almost entirely Lebanese returning home or visiting family. Sadly, I don't think this Ministry of Tourism video will help improve things.

A Pro-Lebanese Strategy

Today, I went to an event at USIP on Lebanon and the Arab Spring featuring Representative Charles Boustany (R-LA). I was generally impressed with Rep. Boustany, not because I agreed with everything he said, but because he approached the issues from a critical and sober perspective. Unfortunately that's all too rare when it comes to the Hill and the Middle East.

During the Q&A, I asked the Congressman: "It seems we do not have a policy on Lebanon, but rather a set of policies on Lebanese actors and institutions. We have a policy on March 14 and March 8, on the STL and on the LAF. But what is our policy on Lebanon? Does it matter we don't have one?"

Rep. Boustany responded first by clarifying that the US doesn't have policies for countries, but rather strategies. He then admitted that the US has not sufficiently developed a clear, unified strategy for Lebanon. While his speech emphasized the need to continue military assistance, broaden educational exchanges, and support parliamentary processes, among other measures, he did not explicitly delineate the strategy that these policies serve. So I'll instead say what I think.

As Rep. Boustany asserted, our primary interest in Lebanon is stability. As a weak state overwhelmed by foreign influences, Lebanon is both susceptible to externally-driven conflict as well as a catalyst to regional instability. We therefore simply cannot afford a flare up of either internal sectarian tensions or an external conflict with Israel - especially at this time of fragile democratic revolutions and a stalled peace process in the region.

It's at this point that many point the finger at Hezbollah and its alliance with Iran and Syria. To be sure, they have all had - some more consistently than others - a negative and disruptive effect on Lebanese and regional politics. But it is a mistake to therefore conclude a pro-stability strategy is an anti-Hezbollah strategy.

That's exactly what we have done in recent years. We've viewed Lebanese politics as a zero-sum game in which we must counteract Hezbollah's influence at every turn. We support its political rivals. We arm the Lebanese military. We push for the Special Tribunal on Lebanon. None of these policies is troubling in of itself. But our intentions to use these policies primarily as an anti-Hezbollah cudgel only escalates the political tensions within Lebanon and the region as a whole. We are sometimes acting - an external actor as we are - in ways that are just as intrusive as Syria and Iran.

In that sense, we are acting at cross purposes. We push against Hezbollah because they are a destabilizing force. But then we contribute to the very dynamic of foreign intervention that makes Lebanon unstable.

Instead, we must reformulate our approach to Lebanon from an anti-Hezbollah to a pro-Lebanese strategy. Many of our policies would remain exactly the same. We would still train the Lebanese military, promote civil society, support governmental institutions like the parliament, and provide economic and development assistance. But we would do so with the ultimate purpose of reinforcing the sovereignty, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Lebanese government.

A pro-Lebanese strategy would also recognize that Hezbollah represents a legitimate segment of the Lebanese population. They may have external patrons, but they are not an external actor. We can help shape the political, economic and social environment that determines Hezbollah's popularity, but no one can ever fully excise Hezbollah from Lebanon's future. Accepting this fact and acting accordingly will require political courage not only here in DC, but also in Tel Aviv and Beirut.

What will help make that pill easier to swallow is the realization that a pro-Lebanese strategy will cause considerable consternation in Damascus and Tehran. In recent years, Hezbollah has had greater difficulty balancing its dual identities as a regional resistance militia and a national socio-political movement. A pro-Lebanese strategy would exacerbate this tension within Hezbollah and help shift the balance towards the national. It may even help lead to a situation where Hezbollah's leadership will be given a stark choice by the Lebanese people: abandon your regional patrons or we will abandon you.

Moreover, unlike Iran and Syria, we can take comfort that our fundamental ideology as a nation does not ring hollow. Iran and Syria have little to offer Lebanon besides repression and economic stagnation. That's why they have no choice but to derive the majority of their influence by pitting one Lebanese faction against the others. But we can offer Lebanon a far more appealing example - one in which democracy and prosperity unite the country and ensure its stability. By adopting a pro-Lebanese strategy, we double down on our belief that our fundamental values are indeed universal - a bet I'm willing to take.

UPDATE: I recently wrote a paper on what a pro-Lebanese framework would look like for resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. It also lays out the argument in much greater detail and, more importantly, addresses the counterarguments. I'll be looking for a way to upload and link the paper shortly.

UPDATE 2: You can read the paper here (PDF).

Terror Attacks, Israeli Reprisals, and Arab Democracy

We've seen a disturbing escalation of violence in Palestine and Israel over the past few days. Rockets from Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Shelling from Israel. Indiscriminate bombs from, so far, an unknown source.

If this trend continues, what will be its effect on the pro-democracy movements across the region?

We should first consider the motives behind the attacks. Arab dictators have long used attacks on Israel to distract from domestic problems. Currently, neither Hamas nor Fatah enjoy significant popular support. Just last week, Human Rights Watch criticized Hamas for violently suppressing peaceful protests in Gaza. Is it a coincidence that, just as people began to liken Hamas to Mubarak, rockets began to fly? Doubtful.

Until we have evidence about who bombed the Jerusalem bus stop today (there was also a pipe bomb two weeks ago), we shouldn't jump to conclusions over who is to blame. It may well be a Palestinian faction. Less likely but still possible, it could be a disillusioned lone actor. Perhaps more intriguing, some have suggested it very well could be a foreign government, such as Syria which has suddenly seen an uptick in unrest.

Regardless of who is responsible, it is far from clear that the violence will achieve its objective of displacing domestic discontent upon foreign enemies. For one, such old tricks have lost their effectiveness over time (fool me once...). But more importantly, for the first time Arabs believe they may finally have a real opportunity to effect change in their countries. Absorbed in their own righteous struggles, they will not be easily distracted. Just as Iranians have chanted "Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I will give my life for Iran," so are Arabs giving their lives - quite literally - for the sake of their own countries.

Thus while an Israeli-Palestinian flare-up may dampen Arab democratic movements, it will be far from a fatal blow. That, of course, does not mean that Arabs no longer care about the plight of the Palestinians. Quite the opposite, as many directly link the overthrow of their dictators to the eventual liberation of Palestine. But at least for now, focus has been turned inward.


While the violence will not end Arab demands for democracy, it will likely color how Arabs interpret American and European military intervention in Libya. Already, the Arab world - with the obvious exception of Libyans - has split on whether to support the mission in Libya. See, for example, how the outgoing Arab League head Amr Moussa has played rhetorical twister over the past week. That uneasiness will turn to outright indignation if violence escalates in Israel and Palestine. Many Arabs will simply not distinguish Israel F-16s flying over Gaza from American F-16s flying over Libya.

We have three purposes in Libya: protect civilians, preserve democracy's momentum in the region, and garner good will for joining the right side of history. If violence escalates in Israel and Palestine, the humanitarian component will remain, as well democracy's momentum for reasons described above. However, any good will we may have earned will be lost. Such perceptions of the U.S. will become increasingly important as Arab countries democratize.

Stopping the violence now is therefore essential. Because we have no influence over Palestinian violent extremists, we will have to primarily focus our efforts to ensure Israeli restraint. This will not be easy. Already, Israel has entered a bunker mentality, especially after the overthrow of Mubarak and the empowerment of Hezbollah. It is no coincidence they will likely ask for $20 billion more in U.S. foreign assistance. Moreover, as President Obama just affirmed, Israel clearly retains the right of self-defense. But sometimes the best defense is heroic restraint. And we will have to win that argument with the Israelis.

UPDATE: Hussein Ibish writes about the same topic here at Foreign Policy. He correctly points out that while increased Israeli-Palestinian violence "won't stop the reform movement dead in its tracks," it will alter the tone of these movements by adding fuel to an anti-Western Islamist narrative.

Speaking Arafrenglish

This weekend, Lebanon's Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, met with Syrian President Assad in Damascus. It was a historic visit for many reasons, perhaps most of all because of the very personal ramifications involved. As The New York Times explains, "the trip epitomized a national story with anguished, almost operatic dimensions: a young leader forced to shake hands with the man who he believes killed his father."

And yet, the story circulating around the blogosphere has nothing to do with that, or Syrian interference in Lebanon's politics, or Hezbollah's arsenal, or anything political at all. Rather, it's a video of Hariri attempting - and failing - to deliver a recent speech in front of the Lebanese Parliament. Quite simply, he doesn't speak Arabic very well.

Now, we Americans know what it's like to have a President who doesn't speak very eloquently We like politicians who are "folksy" and "speak to the people." After all, it's the policies that matter...right?

But in Arabic culture, literacy is extremely important. The Arabic language, with its case endings and its beating rhythm, is meant to be spoken, not read. Poets are revered as noble, and everyone worth his hummus writes the occasional verse or two. In fact, the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed, is well known for his poetic ability - so much so that his official webpage features an entire section on poetry. Even the holy Qu'ran, literally meaning "The Recitation," is not meant to be read, but spoken and heard.

But, as usual, Lebanon is a bit different. Due to its history and politics, the Lebanese people speak a mixture of Arabic, French, and English. Or, for the people I met, they often speak a mixture of all three, mixing and matching vocabulary and even grammar willy nilly. For an American Arabic student who knows a little French, everything sounded familiar and yet incomprehensible at the same time.

The result is that while many Lebanese speak all three languages very well, they don't speak any of them extremely fluently. Usually, a person's most-fluent language indicates what kind of education he/she have received (e.g. American University in Beirut, Université Saint-Joseph, Beirut Arab University, or none at all). Meanwhile, there are many minority groups, like the Armenians, who speak their own languages all together. In this way, language can reveal the religious, ethnic and socioeconomic stratification in Lebanese society.

For example, the Christian Free Patriotic Movement campaigned this summer with English slogans like "I vote for change" and French slogans like "Sois belle et vote" (Be beautiful and vote). In comparison, Shi'ite Hezbollah campaigned in Arabic with the slogan "Not your Lebanon, not our Lebanon, not their Lebanon, but Lebanon."

While Hariri's Future party campaigned in Arabic, Hariri grew up outside of Lebanon and received his education in America. As such, like so many other elite Lebanese, he speaks some combination of Arabic, English, and French. He speaks the unique Lebanese dialect of Arafrenglish.

So let's give Hariri a break. So he's no Khalil Gibran. Big deal. Neither am I, and I can only speak English. Sorta.

Sanctioning Shalom

According to Deena Jawhar in the Middle East International, Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament has unanimously passed a bill sanctioning all contact with Israelis. If also passed by the upper house, a simple Shalom could result in fines up to $25,000 or five years of imprisonment.

Jawhar explains that while Bahrain's government (read: King Hamad) does not officially recognize Israel, it has taken several measures in recent years such as

the closure of an Israel boycott office in 2005; a proposal by the foreign minister last year to establish a regional forum including Israel; a call for dialogue with Israelis made by Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin-Hamad in a Washington Post article published in July; and King Hamad's regular meetings with pro-Israel groups during trips abroad.

As such, the King views the bill as an affront to his prerogative to formulate foreign policy. In fact, the crown prince has argued that normalisation with Israel could bring economic benefits to the country - an argument to which the lower house of parliament and its constituents obviously don't give much credence. However, the upper house may have little choice but to follow the government's line, given that they are appointed by the King himself. Therefore, it is unlikely the bill will ever become a law.

This episode serves as a reminder about how deeply and pervasively hatred towards Israel flows through the Arab world. I can understand why Arabs feel so strongly about the plight of the Palestinian people. I can even comprehend why, at the cost of their own economic welfare, the Bahraini parliament is willing to shoot symbolic salvos at Tel Aviv. But what I don't understand - and what I don't think they have considered - is how their anger also hurts the very people they ostensibly seek to help.

An Israel that feels under siege will not and cannot make peace. Nor is there any shortage of reasons for Israel to feel in danger. If not Hamas, then Hezbollah. If not Hezbollah, then Iran. Then let's not forget Syria. Oh, and al Qaeda-inspired Sunni splinter groups. So does Israel need to feel threatened by Bahrain's lower house of parliament? No, but it's just simply one more excuse to retreat into a psychological bunker.

For there to be a political peace, there must first be a minimum level of mutual trust and mutual confidence. And there can be neither trust nor confidence without contact between the Arabs and Israelis. That is why it is so essential, as President Obama has urged, for both sides to offer gradual confidence-building measures to undergird any political negotiations.

But episodes like these make me wonder whether the anger is simply too great right now to move forward. While President Obama was correct to make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a top priority from the get-go, it might now be better for everyone to take a breather and try again after tempers have cooled.