More on Egyptian-Americans

As many of you know, I just published an article at Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel on Egyptian-Americans and their right to vote in Egypt's elections. The fall of Mubarak has mobilized the community in unprecedented fashion. They have organized, protested, lobbied, fundraised, and broadcasted. In three weeks, it has been finally confirmed they will get to vote. They have done all of this to be part of the revolution which they claim belongs to them as much as every other Egyptian.

Because the article focuses on the debate over expatriate voting, its effects, and its importance, I'd like to use this blog to broaden the scope a bit to give a general sense about the Egyptian-American community post-Mubarak.

The days after the fall of Mubarak were filled with boundless optimism. Like their fellow Egyptians in Tahrir Square, Egyptian-Americans had risen up and caused the regime to crumble. Now they sought to harness the energy of the revolution to strengthen their community and thereby strengthen Egypt. But as we have seen in Egypt itself, reality has begun to encroach upon the magic of the revolution. The days of euphoria seem to have passed - the victory over voting not withstanding.

Tragedy of the Revolutionary Commons

With so many breaking events across the Middle East, it's become increasingly hard to keep up, even for those like myself who consider it their job. Quite simply, my attention and time are limited resources, and I have to choose how to best allocate them. In the process, things fall through the cracks.

The international media face the same problem. Even with a 24 hour news cycle, they can only cover so much. There are simply not enough correspondents and foreign bureaus. Nor is there enough attention span amongst the public. They can only absorb so much information at once. Bandwidth is limited.

International resources are limited too. Our overworked staffers in DC can work only so many hours in a day. Our coffers can afford only so many economic packages. Our diplomats can host only so many meetings. While our military could enforce more no-fly zones, our political will can only stomach so much.

This problem reminds me of Garrett Hardin's article on "The Tragedy of the Commons." Writing about limited environmental resources, he describes the dilemma of cows grazing on common pastures. Every farmer has the individual incentive to graze his cows as much as possible. But if every farmer acts in such a self-interested way, all the combined cows will overgraze the pasture and the community will collectively suffer.

International attention to the Arab revolutions presents its own version of Hardin's tragedy. Citizens in every individual country have an incentive to protest now while the momentum is in democracy's favor and their leaders have lost their balance. But if every Arab population acts for their own interest, international media and resources can only focus on so much.

While international media and resources will not determine the outcome of these revolutions, they can undeniably shift the balance in democracy's favor by supporting efforts on the ground. Yet with every Arab country in revolt, attention is necessarily split, its effect on any given case diminished. Some countries may not get any attention at all.

What can be done then?

The traditional solution to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons is privatization. If every farmer gets his own little parcel of pasture, then he will protect its sustainability out of self-interest. He will only graze as many cows as his land can support.

This is where the analogy to the Arab revolutions breaks down somewhat. We cannot actually "privatize" international attention to the Arab revolutions. But what Arabs can and have done is take the issue in their own hands. They have done so with social media and diaspora networks.

Social media "privatizes" international media by placing the production and dissemination of news in the hands of the people. If I had relied on the international media today, I would not have known about the protests in Jordan today. But thanks to Hafsa Halawa on Twitter, I know all about it.

Diaspora networks "privatize" international attention by providing an alternative source of economic, political, and technical support to the revolutions. For example, at a recent conference called "Together for a New Egypt," Egyptian-Americans joined together to discuss how they can contribute to the revolution in their homeland. The conference harnessed their resurgent pride in their home country and channeled it into productive avenues for action.

While these social media and diaspora efforts will not replace international media and resources, they can and will play an essential role in helping turn the Tragedy of the Revolutionary Commons into a historic victory only dictators will find tragic.

Fickle American Relationships

Bruce Reidel just posted an update on why India abstained from the UNSC resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya. According to Reidel, Indians are "puzzled" by America's inconsistency. He quotes one Indian observer, "the U.S. is both promiscuous and flighty" with its relationships.

Certainly our intervention in Libya is arbitrary. Plenty of other dictators have taken a far larger toll on their populations while incurring little more than an expression of American dismay. Moreover, while Qaddafi was never anything close to our ally, we certainly had a working relationship with him only two months ago.

Yet the fact India feels troubled by our about-face in Libya reflects a significant communication failure. This is especially troubling considering both the Bush and Obama administration has worked hard to forge stronger ties with New Dehli. Nuclear deals, state dinners, and support for permanent status at the UNSC apparently have not adequately proven our commitment to our friendship with India.

We must make it clear to the world that we have two kinds of allies abroad: transactional and substantial. We work with transactional allies because it serves our immediate interests. Mubarak got his fiefdom, and we got counter-terrorism and peace with Israel. While abandoning these relationships can be painful, we will do so once our interests are no longer served.

India is not a transactional ally. Our friendship is far more substantial. Of course, we gain significant benefits from our relationship with India. But that relationship runs deeper than simple trade-offs because we share values of democracy, freedom and pluralism. Just as with our European allies, we will not abandon India for near-term gain. Rather, we have every intention to deepen and broaden our ties.

Moreover, as those ties strengthen, pro-Indian constituencies will coalesce in the U.S. just as pro-American constituencies will coalesce in India. Unlike diaspora groups of authoritarian regimes who lobby for their home goverment's overthrow (e.g. Egyptians and Iranians), diasporas from democratic regimes push for stronger economic, political, and cultural ties. It is these groups that will ensure a strong U.S.-Indian friendship in the future.

If we make the distinction between transactional and substantive allies clear abroad, it will naturally apply pressure to leaders to make essential political reforms. Foreign leaders will come to understand that the only way to secure their permenant friendship with the United States is to uphold the universal rights of their populations. If they can only offer us temporary stability, as Mubarak did, then they will always have to fear their transactional relationship may fall victim one day to American fickleness.

If our close friend India has not heard that message, then it is unlikely any other leader, democratic or authoritarian, has heard it either. And that is a problem.