The May 27th Gamble

May 27th could prove the most important day for the Egyptian revolution since Mubarak's resignation. This Friday, a coalition of revolutionaries have called for a million-man protest. They hope to spark, in their own words, a second Egyptian revolution.

This confrontational strategy is fraught with risks. Of course, the protests will anger the military council ruling Egypt, which cares about stability above all else. But perhaps more worrisome, the protests could further fracture Egyptian society.

We all marveled at the stunning unity of the Egyptian people in Tahrir Square during the revolution. Young and old, Muslim and Christian, rich and poor, urban and rural all chanted together, "The people want the fall of the regime." But as many analysts warned, once those chants became reality, the unity would begin to disintegrate. So it has.

Since Mubarak's resignation, several fractures have become visible. The call for massive protests on May 27th could exacerbate all of them.

First, sectarian tensions between Christian and Muslims have bubbled over on several occasions. As Michael Hanna points out, these tensions "have deep roots in recent Egyptian history [and] may be the most urgent test of how much Egypt has actually changed since the fall of Hosni Mubarak." Violence has prompted some Christians to voice nostalgia for the security of the Mubarak era, and in a few extreme cases, they have even called for foreign intervention. For the first time, we've seen Christians protest separately from those demonstrating in Tahrir Square.

These tensions are even visible in the Egyptian-American community. A recent conference I attended devolved into a shouting match between Christians and Muslims before one well-respected community leader defused the situation with a timely joke.

While the May 27th protest leaders have called on all Egyptians, Muslim and Christian, to descend upon Tahrir Square, they oddly have not included anything concerning religious freedom and tolerance in their list of demands (in Arabic here). For many Christians (and Egypt's other religious minorities), silence on the issue implies acquiescence to the unacceptable status quo.


Second, the debate over the role of Islam in politics has also caused divisions within Egyptian society. Most visibly, Salafists have been behind much of the sectarian troubles in recent months. The Muslim Brotherhood, though it has condemned the violence, has not quelled fears about its ultimate intentions. Mixed messages abound. For example, even though the Brotherhood's new political party includes Christian leadership, it also plans to work closely with Salafi political parties in the upcoming elections.

The May 27th protests will have to recruit their million men and women without the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has refused to participate. As one of the best organized organizations in Egypt, the Brotherhood sees an interest in holding elections as soon as possible and therefore does not want any major disturbances to delay the electoral schedule.

Yet the Brotherhood also initially refused to officially participate in the January 25th revolution. If the protests gather momentum, they may change their mind about May 27th as well. Moreover, it's not clear they will be able to maintain their own unity. Just as they did in the January 25th revolutions, youth members of the movement may join the protests without official permission, further contributing to a generational divide within the organization. Finally, the May 27th protests may further split the interests of the estranged Brotherhood member who has declared his candidacy for president against the wishes of the leadership.

Third, different revolutionary priorities have also led to disagreement. On May 15th, a largely secular crowd protested in front of the Israeli embassy in commemoration of what they call the Nakba, or the "catastrophe" of the founding of Israel and the coerced migration of Palestinians. For many Egyptians, the protests and resulting crackdown was an unnecessary distraction from Egypt's tremendous internal problems. As the blogger Zeinobia put it, May 15th "was truly Nakba for all Egypt, no one won as everybody lost." That is not to say Palestine isn't important to Egyptians or to the Egyptian revolution, as this post by Hossam el-Hamalawy clearly shows. But rather, many simply feel now is not the right time to stir up yet another hornet's nest.

Instead, people like Wael Ghonim have urged the revolutionaries to focus on the economic conditions of the country. Underlying this argument is a valid concern that the revolution has lost touch with the needs and aspirations of the average Egyptian who cares more about bread than abstract political rights.

Tellingly, the May 27th organizers have placed the economy at the top of their agenda. However, their demands take a clear ideological turn to the left. They call for the establishment of a minimum and maximum wage, "the distribution of wealth to rescue the country from economic crisis," price controls, progressive tax schedules, and the prosecution of corrupt businessmen to recover ill-gained earnings.

Putting aside the question of what would objectively best serve Egypt's economy, the socialist slant of these demands may alienate certain segments of the Egyptian society who would otherwise participate on May 27th. For example, there is no mention of the need to promote economic growth through investment, trade and tourism or how protests would serve those ends. In addition, the question of foreign assistance will prove an obstacle to unity. As business magnate and newly-minted politician Naguib Sawiris in favor of such assistance tweeted recently, "busy writing the economic program of our party, not sure left wingers will like it!" But the thought of foreign assistance disgusts many Egyptians, such as Gigi Ibrahim who likened it to "shackles."

All of these issues - sectarianism, Islamism and revolutionary priorities - combine to form significant obstacles for the May 27th protests by draining possible sources of support. Unfortunate in-fighting between the revolutionaries, sparked by a mixture of jealousy and policy disagreement, has also hampered unity. But the greatest hurdle may simply be public fatigue. For months, Egyptians have lived on the edge. They were willing to balance on that edge to overthrow Mubarak. But with so many fault lines running through Egyptian society, it is unclear they are willing to continue to do so on May 27th. Nor is it clear that the demands of the May 27th protests can best be achieved on the street.

I am sure the May 27th organizers have carefully considered these questions, weighed the pros and cons, and decided to take a massive risk. They may succeed in sparking a second revolution that will bring true change to Egypt. Or they may drastically fail and even irrevocably tarnish the cadre of revolutionaries who led the way on January 25th. We will know Friday whether their gamble will pay off.

UPDATE: A blogger I cite above, Zeinobia, has translated the list of demands for May 27th and added her own commentary here.

Rethinking Democracy Assistance

Yesterday I went to an event at GW on "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." The three speakers,  Steven Heydemann, Eva Bellin and Ellen Lust, have all been writing about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East for years. And unfortunately, they focused mainly on that question as opposed to pivoting to the supposed topic of the day: how the US can help more effectively support democratic reform in the region.

Nonetheless, their talks reflect the importance of understanding what's happening in the region as a prerequisite for formulating effective policy. While they did not explicitly address democracy promotion, their analyses imply certain policies, some of which would be quite unorthodox.

For example, Heydemann emphasized that it's not just the opposition that learns how to better agitate for their rights, but regimes also learn how to better repress their citizens. He calls this "upgrading authoritarianism," in which regimes can become "stronger, more flexible, and more resilient" over time. Specifically in the past few months, the leaders of countries like Yemen and Syria have seen the way Ben Ali and Mubarak have been treated and learned that: 1) more violence is needed 2) if I step down, I might end up in jail or worse.

Based on Heydemann's anlaysis, democracy promotion policy should look closely at the strategic calculus of these leaders to learn how to best coax them to implement actual reforms, or when necessary, step down. This means ICC investigations of Qaddafi are counterproductive. Promises of immunity are untrustworthy. And safety in exile becomes paramount. Enhancing programs like the Mo Ibrahim Prize, which grants former African leaders a nice stipend for transferring power peacefully, would make sense. As unsavory as it sounds, offering President Saleh a mansion in the Hamptons might be more effective use of democracy promotion money than funding civil society programs.

Eva Bellin focused her analysis on the decision of the security apparatus to repress its citizens. For Bellin, so long as the military is capable and willing of shooting civilians, authoritarian regimes will survive. She provided three variables to determine willingness to shoot: the size of the protests, the nature of the protests (peaceful or violent), and finally the professionalism of the military.

This analysis suggests that US assistance to foreign militaries could actually have a democratizing effect. While such assistance undoubtedly increases the capacity to repress, if it is executed in a manner that professionalizes the military (instills institutional pride, builds national identity, weakens patrimonial ties, etc), then the military will be less willing to sacrifice its self interests by shooting civilians in revolutionary moments. Coincidentally, we are working hard to professionalize militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon. This policy prescription is quite counterintuitive, as military assistance is usually considered an example of propping up authoritarian regimes.

Finally, among other topics, Lust identified the importance of considering the variable of time. Combined with Heydemann and Bellin's emphasis on the robustness of authoritarianism, we should consider the difference between promoting democratic evolution versus democratic revolution. Currently, we hope that minor changes over time will accrue and eventually lead to democratic systems. But if authoritarian regimes are in fact so adaptive and coercive, then maybe only revolutions can bring democracy in the Middle East. In that case, why waste resources on policies designed for evolutionary change?

Now I'm not saying these policy prescriptions are what Heydemann, Bellin and Lust would prescribe. Nor am I saying I think they are correct. In fact, I think some are flat wrong, and they are wrong because they are based on flawed understandings of why the Middle East is undemocratic. But that just proves the more general point: we need to understand the region before we understand how to democratize that region. So even though this event largely ignored policy prescriptions, it still was quite useful in learning how we might formulate policy in the future.

Nitpicking Egypt's Constitutional Amendments

A committee appointed by the military council in charge in Egypt recently released several proposed amendments to the constitution. They will be voted on by the people within the next few weeks. For a full review, check out Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne's piece here. For this blog, I'm going to focus on one of the proposed changes: Article 189.

Originally, it was expected that this committee would propose changes to the constitution essential for fair elections, elections would be held for parliament and then president, and finally the newly elected officials would take a more thorough look at how to change the constitution more broadly (or write an entirely new one). The proposed Article 189 changes that plan.

Instead of mandating further constitutional changes after elections, it instead offers a procedure for how and when a new constitution can be written and adopted. Specifically, either the president or a majority in both houses of parliament can vote in favor of a new constitution. If that vote passes, parliament forms a 100 member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution to be voted upon by the people within 6 months.

If this measure passes, notice that it'll be easier to change the constitution in Egypt than it is to pass a law in the United States. This is a problem. Constitutions are supposed to act as the bedrock of politics, stable enough to provide security, flexible enough to ensure relativity. That's why after over two centuries, we've only amended our constitution 27 times. Of those, 10 were added simultaneously with ratification and two cancel each other out. So practically, we've only passed 15 amendments that stuck.

Yet if Article 189 passes, it'll be far too easy to amend the Egyptian constitution, defeating its purpose of providing political stability. Instead, with every shift in of the political winds, the constitution will be at threat. The temptation to seek amendments to gain political advantage will always be lurking behind every legislative debate and electoral challenge.

Now admittedly, it is likely the committee proposed Article 189 with the intention of making constitutional change easy the first time around, expecting the article to be removed in the next round of amendments. Practically, this plan makes sense as a political compromise in a time of immense uncertainty.

But here's the problem. Democracy isn't just about institutions and processes. It's a deeply-engrained understanding that a government serves its people. While not all democracies have constitutions, all democracies understand that a contract between people and government form the foundation of politics. The Egyptian constitution should outline that social contract and give life to its budding democracy. Adding amendments to that fundamental contract with the intention that they should be removed when convenient is not exactly an auspicious start.

It sets a bad precedent. Moreover, it echoes the worst of its antecedents. Mubarak lasted for nearly three decades by creating what political scientists call a liberalizing autocracy. Essentially, he set up all the bells and whistles of democracy - constitutions, elections, parliaments, etc - while squashing any force that truly portended democratic values. Mubarak's democracy was a sham democracy. Mubarak's constitution was a sham constitution. It helped him stay in power, and when it didn't, he changed it to keep him in power. After Mubarak forced through several devastating amendments in 2007, some government websites failed to even bother updating their websites.

That is what the constitution was worth in the old Egypt. In the new Egypt, a constitution must mean so much more. It must not only capture the organic spirit of Tahrir, but also organize that spirit into a workable and stable politics. By proposing Article 189 that is not intended to last, the committee has focused too keenly on the momentarily pragmatic at the expense of an enduring ideal.

I recognize I'm nitpicking here. There are so many things to worry about in Egypt right now. Amendment 189 is far down on that list. But this is the future Egyptian constitution we're talking about here. It should be nitpicked.

Egyptian Democracy When Pigs Fly

Last week, I went to an event hosted by the Wilson Center that featured Egyptian journalist Heba el-Koudsy discussing American democracy promotion in Egypt. You can see a summary of the event here. Or, for the more visually-inclined, the video is available online here.


During her lecture, el-Koudsy differentiated between external American and internal Egyptian pressure for reform. She argued it has always been the internal push for reform that has prodded President Mubarak into (insufficient) action. As such, the U.S. should focus on ways to support the internal drive for democratization by, for example, bolstering civil society.


At minute 53, I asked her how the potential candidacy Mohamed ElBaradei may provide a new source of internal leverage for reform on the Mubarak regime.

To give a quick background, Egypt will be holding its second-ever multi-party competitive elections for president in 2011. All experts agree that the presidency will remain in Mubarak's hands through manipulation and coercion. The only question is whether it'll be Hosni or his son Gamal who will be the Mubarak in charge.

Enter Elbaradei. Currently, he enjoys broad popularity in Egypt for his service as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. As such, the Wafd party - one of the oldest parties in Egypt and considered an opposition party - asked the historically apolitical ElBaradei to run as their candidate for president.


After mulling it over, ElBaradei announced he would only run in the very unlikely scenario that elections were "free and fair." Shortly after that announcement, he upped the ante again, declaring he would only run as an independent candidate. To translate for you, he basically said he'd run for president when pigs fly.

The Egyptian constitution, while technically allowing independent candidates to run for president, sets an overwhelming number of restrictions and qualifications on an independent candidacy. To give a domestic example, imagine if a candidate declared he/she would only run for president if the electoral college were abolished, and even then, as neither a Democrat or Republican. That's what ElBaradei is doing.

In short, it won't ever happen under the current constitution. And more importantly, everyone - including ElBaradei and Mubarak - know it will never happen. And yet, according to El-Koudsy, something is happening.

Egyptians are no longer only talking about Mubarak versus Mubarak. ElBaradei's announcement has stimulated Egypt's political conscious, sparking new debate and revealing new possibilities. But most importantly, Mubarak's farcical and cynical use of democratic institutions to mask his dictatorship have been laid bare. And that's exactly what ElBaradei sought to achieve by effectively refusing to participate in sham elections.

During his tenure as IAEA chief, he scoured the deserts of Iraq in search for the mythical weapons of mass destruction and negotiated endlessly with the intransigent Iranian regime. Now as an Egyptian politician, he seems to be prepared to put those experiences to good use: to continue chasing fantasy while tirelessly confronting an uncompromising regime.

And if he and other Egyptians persist, maybe one day that fantasy will be fantasy no more.

Playing Mubarak's Games

Earlier this week, an Egyptian opposition blogger was abducted, beaten, and left in the streets to bleed. Today, the Egyptian government suddenly released from prison (Arabic) a key leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such is the arbitrary brutality of the Mubarak regime.

The blogger, Kareem el-Shae'r, moderates the Free Egypt blog and is a member of the el-Ghad (Tomorrow) party. The liberal, secular el-Ghad party is led by Ayman Nour, who mounted a historic and unsuccessful campaign against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt's first mutli-party presidential election in 2005. Nour was jailed for his chutzpah after the election on trumped up charges, only to be finally released this year. Beyond imprisoning Nour, the regime has sought to discredit and intimidate the el-Ghad party, as exemplified by the beating of el-Shae'r.*

The Muslim Brotherhood leader, Dr. Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh, serves as a member of the MB's Guidance Council. Currently, the MB is split between two ideological camps: a conservative faction that favors cultivating Islam within the organization and a reformist camp that seeks greater political participation outside the organization. Abul Futouh heads the reformist camp, and for that reason, was jailed by the government as a threat to the regime.

There is inconsistent tendency amongst some Western observers to criticize Mubarak for repressing secular democrats such as Ayman Nour while ignoring the offenses committed against Islamist opposition figures like Abul Futouh.

On some emotional level, our inconsistency makes sense. We understandably empathize with people who share our secular, liberal values. In turn, it is harder to commiserate with adherents to political Islam, an ideology we Americans find foreign and even threatening. But we must remember, repression is repression. We should be repulsed by the methods of repression, not its victims.

In fact, President Mubarak hopes that we distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' repression. For 28 years, he has painted himself as our only option in Egypt. He claims Islamists pose a mortal threat and the secularists are too weak to stop their spread. Therefore, we have no choice but to support his reign as our indispensable ally.

But it's a tricky game he plays. For one, he doesn't explain why the secular opposition is so weak (that's because he's the primary reason). And two, he purposefully paints the Muslim Brotherhood as violent-prone zealots. To be fair, some of their members are nothing short of unsavory. But there are other Brothers, such as Abul Futouh, who represent a moderate Islamist voice.

Except we're not listening. Despite Mubarak's fearmongering, the reformist camp within the Muslim Brotherhood represents some of Egypt's most fervent democrats. For example, Brotherhood blogger Abdel-Monem Mahmoud (who has also spent time in jail) writes:

We have an established principle in Islam which is equivalent to democracy — it’s Shura. This means that we, as young MBs, firmly believe that the only way we can come to power is through ballot boxes. And if we came to power and didn’t live up to the electorate’s expectations, we would be removed from power also through ballot boxes. We will not remain in power for ever, or abuse it.

With such a powerful affirmation of democracy, it's no wonder Mubarak fears the reformist camp in the Muslim Brotherhood just as much, if not more, than the secular opposition. It is a wonder, however, why the U.S. buys into Mubarak's games. If we can talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sunni militias in Iraq - groups that actively seek to kill our troops - why can't we talk to the non-violent Muslim Brotherhood? What do we have to fear from the likes of Abul Futouh and Monem?

*I'm not aware of any physical proof the regime was responsible for the beating, but it's a safe bet they were involved somehow.