The May 27th Gamble

May 27th could prove the most important day for the Egyptian revolution since Mubarak's resignation. This Friday, a coalition of revolutionaries have called for a million-man protest. They hope to spark, in their own words, a second Egyptian revolution.

This confrontational strategy is fraught with risks. Of course, the protests will anger the military council ruling Egypt, which cares about stability above all else. But perhaps more worrisome, the protests could further fracture Egyptian society.

We all marveled at the stunning unity of the Egyptian people in Tahrir Square during the revolution. Young and old, Muslim and Christian, rich and poor, urban and rural all chanted together, "The people want the fall of the regime." But as many analysts warned, once those chants became reality, the unity would begin to disintegrate. So it has.

Since Mubarak's resignation, several fractures have become visible. The call for massive protests on May 27th could exacerbate all of them.

First, sectarian tensions between Christian and Muslims have bubbled over on several occasions. As Michael Hanna points out, these tensions "have deep roots in recent Egyptian history [and] may be the most urgent test of how much Egypt has actually changed since the fall of Hosni Mubarak." Violence has prompted some Christians to voice nostalgia for the security of the Mubarak era, and in a few extreme cases, they have even called for foreign intervention. For the first time, we've seen Christians protest separately from those demonstrating in Tahrir Square.

These tensions are even visible in the Egyptian-American community. A recent conference I attended devolved into a shouting match between Christians and Muslims before one well-respected community leader defused the situation with a timely joke.

While the May 27th protest leaders have called on all Egyptians, Muslim and Christian, to descend upon Tahrir Square, they oddly have not included anything concerning religious freedom and tolerance in their list of demands (in Arabic here). For many Christians (and Egypt's other religious minorities), silence on the issue implies acquiescence to the unacceptable status quo.


Second, the debate over the role of Islam in politics has also caused divisions within Egyptian society. Most visibly, Salafists have been behind much of the sectarian troubles in recent months. The Muslim Brotherhood, though it has condemned the violence, has not quelled fears about its ultimate intentions. Mixed messages abound. For example, even though the Brotherhood's new political party includes Christian leadership, it also plans to work closely with Salafi political parties in the upcoming elections.

The May 27th protests will have to recruit their million men and women without the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has refused to participate. As one of the best organized organizations in Egypt, the Brotherhood sees an interest in holding elections as soon as possible and therefore does not want any major disturbances to delay the electoral schedule.

Yet the Brotherhood also initially refused to officially participate in the January 25th revolution. If the protests gather momentum, they may change their mind about May 27th as well. Moreover, it's not clear they will be able to maintain their own unity. Just as they did in the January 25th revolutions, youth members of the movement may join the protests without official permission, further contributing to a generational divide within the organization. Finally, the May 27th protests may further split the interests of the estranged Brotherhood member who has declared his candidacy for president against the wishes of the leadership.

Third, different revolutionary priorities have also led to disagreement. On May 15th, a largely secular crowd protested in front of the Israeli embassy in commemoration of what they call the Nakba, or the "catastrophe" of the founding of Israel and the coerced migration of Palestinians. For many Egyptians, the protests and resulting crackdown was an unnecessary distraction from Egypt's tremendous internal problems. As the blogger Zeinobia put it, May 15th "was truly Nakba for all Egypt, no one won as everybody lost." That is not to say Palestine isn't important to Egyptians or to the Egyptian revolution, as this post by Hossam el-Hamalawy clearly shows. But rather, many simply feel now is not the right time to stir up yet another hornet's nest.

Instead, people like Wael Ghonim have urged the revolutionaries to focus on the economic conditions of the country. Underlying this argument is a valid concern that the revolution has lost touch with the needs and aspirations of the average Egyptian who cares more about bread than abstract political rights.

Tellingly, the May 27th organizers have placed the economy at the top of their agenda. However, their demands take a clear ideological turn to the left. They call for the establishment of a minimum and maximum wage, "the distribution of wealth to rescue the country from economic crisis," price controls, progressive tax schedules, and the prosecution of corrupt businessmen to recover ill-gained earnings.

Putting aside the question of what would objectively best serve Egypt's economy, the socialist slant of these demands may alienate certain segments of the Egyptian society who would otherwise participate on May 27th. For example, there is no mention of the need to promote economic growth through investment, trade and tourism or how protests would serve those ends. In addition, the question of foreign assistance will prove an obstacle to unity. As business magnate and newly-minted politician Naguib Sawiris in favor of such assistance tweeted recently, "busy writing the economic program of our party, not sure left wingers will like it!" But the thought of foreign assistance disgusts many Egyptians, such as Gigi Ibrahim who likened it to "shackles."

All of these issues - sectarianism, Islamism and revolutionary priorities - combine to form significant obstacles for the May 27th protests by draining possible sources of support. Unfortunate in-fighting between the revolutionaries, sparked by a mixture of jealousy and policy disagreement, has also hampered unity. But the greatest hurdle may simply be public fatigue. For months, Egyptians have lived on the edge. They were willing to balance on that edge to overthrow Mubarak. But with so many fault lines running through Egyptian society, it is unclear they are willing to continue to do so on May 27th. Nor is it clear that the demands of the May 27th protests can best be achieved on the street.

I am sure the May 27th organizers have carefully considered these questions, weighed the pros and cons, and decided to take a massive risk. They may succeed in sparking a second revolution that will bring true change to Egypt. Or they may drastically fail and even irrevocably tarnish the cadre of revolutionaries who led the way on January 25th. We will know Friday whether their gamble will pay off.

UPDATE: A blogger I cite above, Zeinobia, has translated the list of demands for May 27th and added her own commentary here.

End of Poverty and Islam

In his latest op ed, Nick Kristof gives a good argument why Islam is neither the problem nor the solution for the Middle East's economic woes. The article hinges upon a new book by Timur Kuran that shows how specific Islamic legal institutions hindered economic growth. I haven't read the book yet, so I'll focus on Kristof. While he gets the conclusion right, the framing of his argument is incomplete.

He begins with an obvious observation: the Middle East has fallen behind economically from the West. Many often assume that this difference must be caused from something specific about the Middle East. Somehow, something, at some time, went wrong in the region.

Because Islam is the most salient characteristic of the Middle East, it often gets blamed. Kristof rightly dismisses that argument. If Islam were the problem, it's hard to explain why the Middle East used to flourish economically. Moreover, the economic effects of religion varies over time - not only because the economic and political environment changes, but also because religion itself evolves.

But what gets lost in that debate is that perhaps nothing went wrong in the Middle East, but rather, something went right in the West. As Jeffrey Sachs shows in The End of Poverty, standards of living were relatively similar on a global level only a few hundred years ago. But starting with the agricultural revolution, Europe began to shoot ahead. A small growth percentage advantage per year accumulated over several centuries, transforming a small discrepancy into a yawning schism.

The relevant questions are therefore what did Europe do right? Why has it taken the Middle East so long to follow suit? And perhaps the most difficult: are there other ways of getting things right?

None of this suggests Kristof comes to the wrong conclusions. In fact, I think he's completely right. It's just a matter of framing the argment differently.

Arab Israeli Women At Work

As explained by Himmat Zoabi in Haaretz, Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz recently sought to explain high unemployment amongst Arab Israeli women. Citing low female employment across the Arab world, Minister Steinitz partially blamed conservative Arab culture.

However, Zoabi argues that this argument obscures a more important truth. Namely, not only do Arab Israeli women work less than other Israeli women, but they even suffer from higher unemployment than woman in other Arab countries. According to Zoabi, 21.1% of Arab Israeli women are employed compared to 51.3% of all Israeli women. Meanwhile, 29% of Saudi women, 27% of Omani women and 42% of Moroccan women are employed.

The question, therefore, is, "why do fewer Arab women have jobs in Israel than Saudi Arabia?"

Zoabi primarily blames the Israeli government and its "policy of deliberate and consistent discrimination against Arab citizens." Specifically, compared to their Jewish counterparts, Arab villages have insufficient access to public transportation and employment training programs. Furthermore, Zoabi cites:

the shortage of day-care centers in Arab towns (of 1,600 day-care centers for children under 3 that receive government assistance, only 25 operate in Arab communities) and government-supported industrial zones (only 3.2 percent are in Arab areas). In addition, Arab women constitute a mere 3 percent of civil servants, even though the civil service is the largest employer of women in Israel.

Importantly, Zoabi does not dismiss the problems posed by Arab culture, but urges the government to "leave the social barriers to us." And, in fact, I have personally seen the efforts undertaken by Arab Israeli women to make a better life for themselves and their families. During a recent trip to Israel, I visited the women of the Sharikat Haya program, which trains Arab women and helps find them employment. Specifically, the women learn a range of practical skills, such as how to write a resume and use a computer, as well as Hebrew language courses.

But the truly inspiring part comes from listening to their stories. Most of them are under the age of 25, already have at least one child, and have decided to attend the program against the better judgement of their spouses. They are driven. They want to help their families. And they seek to discover their potential.

Importantly, the funding for Sharikat Haya comes from the Abraham Fund Initiatives that "seeks civic equality for Israel's Jewish and Arab Citizens as a moral and pragmatic imperative." Therefore, significant amounts of the financial support (I'm sorry but I can't read Hebrew to be certain of exact numbers) comes from the Jewish community. And that's great, the more the better.

But at the same time, we cannot neglect the other half of the problem that Zoabi outlines. For to truly solve the problem of high female unemployment, we need to tackle all its aspects - political, cultural, economic, linguistic, pragmatic - all at once.

Since 1989, Israeli's GDP/capita has more than quadrupled, but it has done so by and large without the participation of its Arab minority, both male and female. Imagine what might happen if the Israeli government addressed even half the issues Zoabi identifies. Imagine what might be accomplished if 20% of the Israeli population finally began to fully contribute. And imagine the implications for peaceful coexistance and, yes, even cooperation.

The Haredim Conundrum

Bernard Avishai at TPMCafe reports on a telling story about an Intel facility in Israel. Last Sabbath, ultra-orthodox Haredi rabbis and their disciples descended upon the Intel compound and vandalized it. After a meeting with the Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat and Knesset Speaker Ruby Rivlin, who Avishai calls "rightists tied to Haredi voters," the groups came to an agreement. Only 20 of the usual 120 employees would come to work on Saturdays and none of them would be Jewish. But, as Avishai informs, the compromise apparently did not go far enough and the Haredi "mobs were back yesterday demanding a complete shut down."

The Haredi Jews present a difficult conundrum for the Jewish State of Israel. On one hand, they claim that studying Torah is their profession. And, after all, what Jew can be against that? But on the other hand, studying Torah is their profession. In other words, they don't work. According to data from the Israeli and Housing Construction Ministry, approximately 70% of Haredi men are unemployed.

Not only do they fail to contribute to society in any material way, but Israel society actually has to pay them through various welfare programs. In fact, according to Meirav Arlosoroff, the Haredi Jews are offered such a large subsidy to study Torah that they have no economic incentive to seek regular employment. While there has been discrimination against the Haredim in the workplace, it is clear many are quite happy living off the largess of the state.

Beyond economics, the Haredim conundrum plays directly into the Israeli struggle of how to define the Jewish State and Judaism more generally. Ask a typical Haredi rabbi in Meah Shearim and he'll define Judaism in exactly the same way a rabbi would have in 17th century Eastern Europe. Obviously, most Jews in Israel (and elsewhere) have trouble with such an uncompromising definition.

The problem is not in the difference in opinion, but in the suggestion that Haredim maintain the sole prerogative to define Judaism to the exclusion of other equally-valid possibilities. It is this belief in their exclusive right to define Judaism that motivates their "defense" of the Sabbath, as exemplified with the protests at Intel (or, for anyone secular who has ventured too deeply into Haredim territory, the all-too-real threat of rock throwing).

I visited Israel for the first time this summer after an extended stay in the Arab world. Coincidentally, I visited at the same time the Haredim were protesting a parking lot that was open on the Sabbath. It is odd to admit that, after exploring countless Arab neighborhoods, I felt the most unwanted when visiting Haredi areas. But it is downright sad to admit that, after visiting so many mosques, I felt the most alien when visiting the epicenter of Judaism - the Wailing Wall - surrounded by Haredim, Jews that I do not fully understand nor fully understand me.


Below, I've added a picture from my excursion into Meah Shearim. Among other announcements, a flier exclaims, that people are "murdering" the Sabbath and calls for protests.

Gaza Tunnels and Rockets

Time Magazine just released a great photo album about the Gaza Tunnels. To give a quick background, Gaza has been under a strict blockade by both Israel and Egypt since the militant Islamist Hamas took control. The effect on the everyday lives of Gazans has been devastating, with up to 80% of the population reliant on some type of assistance.

In response to the blockade, Gazans have constructed countless tunnels underneath the Egyptian-Gaza border. Originally intended for military goods, a veritable boom economy has sprouted around the tunnel system. All kinds of products now make the subterranean trip beneath the border, including animals for the Gaza zoo (though it was cheaper to paint stripes on a donkey than bring in a real zebra) . If you're interested in taking a trip yourself through the tunnels, check out this video by Current TV contributor and Gaza resident Zouheir Alnajjar.

However, we shouldn't forget why the blockade was originally instituted. Israel has been under intermittent but terrifying rocket attacks for years, both from Gaza and Lebanon. Besides his video on the tunnels, Alnajjar also provides an unsettling glimpse into the process of building and firing a Qassam rocket. But I'll embed this video by Jaron Gilinksy, also from Current, that shows a Katyusha rocket attack from Lebanon in 2006 that hits as he conducts an interview about that very topic.