What's happening in Syria?

Several people have asked me recently what the heck is going on in Syria. So I've written a brief run down of what's going on and how we got here. This is meant as a primer, and a lot of what I wrote is admittedly overly simplified. But hopefully it captures the important stuff without obfuscating too much.

This is what is happening in Syria:

Inspired by other Arab uprisings, the Syrian people began a peaceful movement in 2011 to reform and later overthrow the regime of Bashar Assad. Bashar and his father Hafez before him have ruled Syria with an iron grip for decades. It was therefore no surprise the regime responded with a violent crackdown. Assad promised that the region would burn if the international community supported the opposition.

The Syrian opposition failed to unify in the face of regime violence, as some continued to protest peacefully but others began to pick up arms to meet force with force. Neighborhood defense forces and military defectors grew into the Free Syrian Army, a loose coalition of armed groups across the country opposed to the Assad regime. Protests morphed into clashes and, soon enough, full-on battles.

The violence exacerbated pre-existing societal cleavages within the country, and sectarianism grew increasingly salient. Sunnis, who represent the majority of Syrians, became the loudest voice within the opposition. Assad, who comes from the minority Alawite community, attracted the support of other minority sects, including Shia and Christians, who feared Sunni intentions. Of course, not all Sunnis support the opposition and not all minorities support the regime – but these schisms have grown ever deeper. Kurdish Syrians have also fought both sides as they attempt to carve out their own autonomy.

Now, radicals from all communities have drowned out moderates. This process has been accelerated by the intervention of outside forces that have stirred the sectarian pot. Assad has relied increasingly on Iran and Hezbollah – both Shia who face common Sunni rivals. Meanwhile, Sunni groups inspired by and part of al-Qaeda have joined the fight on the side of the opposition and become some of its most powerful military forces. Gulf states, also Sunni, have contributed arms and financing to the rebels. As the war has become more transnational, so has the risk that it’ll spill over in neighboring Lebanon, Iraq and to a lesser extent Turkey and Jordan. Now, factions within both the regime and the opposition speak openly of ethnic cleansing and have committed countless war crimes.

And to be clear, Syria is a civil war. Over 100,000 people have died in the past two years in Syria, and there is no sign the violence will abate any time soon. One in four Syrians are now displaced from their homes. The battle has reached largely a stalemate, after a series of rebel advances were stopped and reversed earlier this year. The opposition has secured control of much of the north and the east, near the Turkish border. The regime has control of the south and the west, near the Lebanon border. The capital Damascus is controlled by the regime, but the rebels control many of the Damascus suburbs.

It is in these suburbs which the Assad regime has most recently used chemical weapons, likely sarin gas. It is not the first time the regime has used chemical weapons, but the scale of this attack (somewhere between 300 and 1200 dead) is unprecedented. It is the worst use of chemical weapons since Saddam Hussein gassed Iraqi Kurds in the late 1980's. We know the regime used chemical weapons because we intercepted regime communications talking about the attack. Still, the attack only represents a small fraction of the total people killed in the past two years, largely from small arms, shelling, and bombs.

It is not clear why Assad would use chemical weapons on this scale. The timing is also odd, because the UN had just deployed a team of chemical weapons experts to investigate previous attacks. Some experts say the attack may not have been approved from the top. Others suggest that they meant to use chemical weapons, but accidentally killed more people than they intended. What is clear, however, is Assad has been perfectly willing to kill civilians indiscriminately in a myriad of ways, and there have been little international repercussions for doing so thus far. So the fact he's willing to gas his own people is, sadly, not shocking. For what it's worth, the regime has denied responsibility and said it was the rebels who used chemical weapons. 

President Obama warned Syria last year that the use of chemical weapons was a red line that would fundamentally change our approach to the conflict. From an early stage of the revolution, the US said Assad should step aside to allow a political resolution. As the revolution turned violent, the administration resisted pressure to arm the Syrian rebels, claiming that their disunity would make it impossible to prevent arms from falling into extremist hands. After Assad first used chemical weapons earlier this year, the administration decided to finally arm the rebels, even though those very extremists are even more powerful than before. No weapons have yet been delivered in any sizable amount, but we have provided training to armed opposition groups and likely have provided other logistical support.

Unlike the US, Russia has not hesitated to provide substantial military and economic support to the side it supports: Assad. Russia, along with China, has consistently stymied every move at the UN to condemn and punish the Assad regime.

The latest chemical attack will likely push the US to respond with military force. The goal will not be regime change like in Libya, but to punish Assad for crossing our red line and for violating the international norm against using chemical weapons. We will likely target a few military installations and other key infrastructure, causing enough damage to make it hurt but not so much to force Assad to retaliate. It is unlikely we will risk flying our own planes over Syria, so we will instead rely on cruise missiles.  

For his part, Assad has threatened retribution against anyone who supports a military strike by the West. Fighting for his literal survival, it is unclear if any amount of cruise missiles will force him to abandon his murderous path.

Our European allies, and especially Great Britain, will stand with us politically and in a few cases militarily. Arab states seem hesitant to provide political support, especially after a July 3 coup in Egypt removed the pro-opposition president Mohamed Morsi. Unlike in Libya, the Security Council will not approve any military action, because Russia and China will veto any measure authorizing the use of force. They say it’s because they’re angry with NATO for overstepping its mandate in Libya by taking a mandate to protect civilians and using it to overthrow the Muammar Qaddafi regime. But in reality, they just care for what they perceive are their national interests. The US will instead look to build an ad hoc coalition to try to give our intervention the veneer of international legitimacy. 

There is now little hope in Syria, and our bombs falling on Assad targets will be lost in the noise of violence that has engulfed the country. Even if Assad were to fall tomorrow, the violence he has unleashed will continue for years to come. Worse, there are fewer and fewer good guys to support as extremists take control across the political spectrum. We can only hope to try to curb the worst excesses of violence within the country and try and prevent it from engulfing the rest of the region.

UPDATE: I added a few lines about why Assad may have used chemical weapons.

The Long View on Bahrain

This week will mark the two-year anniversary of the uprising in Bahrain. A lot has changed since those first early protests, and yet so much remains the same.

New political groups have formed, but the main cleavage remains between those who have and those who have not. Broad political movements have fragmented, but the Khalifa have always taken advantage of such schisms to maintain their rule. The contagion of sectarianism has spread, but it has always infected Bahrain to some degree. The pearl monument has fallen, but its memory remains fresh as ever.

So, much remains the same as two years ago. And in fact, much remains the same from two centuries ago. The Bahraini uprising is only the latest iteration of Bahrain's long history in uprisings that have wracked Bahrain every generation under the Khalifa regime. The problem boils down to one simple truth: a minority of have's control the economic and political order, and the majority of have-not's will continue to revolt periodically until they succeed in building a more just system.

What to Remember and What to Forget

Yesterday, Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans were slain in a terror attack against our consulate in Benghazi, Libya. While the attack appears to have been pre-planned, the terrorists took advantage (or potentially stoked) anti-American protests over a bigoted film denigrating Islam. Meanwhile, protests in Egypt over the film turned ugly as demonstrators scaled the walls of our embassy and tore apart the American flag.

Yesterday was also the day we vowed to never forget the attacks of 11 years ago. And there is much that we should never forget. We should never forget the heroism of firefighters climbing up stairways and diplomats serving under fire. We should never forget the common bond we share as Americans and how that bond is strengthened by our differences. We should never forget our perseverance as a nation and the image of an American flag rustling above the rubble. We should never forget our founding principles as a nation that should guide us in everything we do. We should never forget the sacrifices made by our fellow Americans serving in our military and diplomatic corps. Most of all, we should never forget the fallen and the families they left behind.

Yesterdal also proved to be the day that we should forget some things. To those who seek political advantage in the face of national tragedy, forget you. To those who spew venomous hatred against others, forget you too. And to those who feed the spiral of extremism by responding to bigotry with violence, forget you most of all. We have so many better things to remember than you.

Security Sector Reform

Andrew Exum and Dana Stuster call for a stronger emphasis on security sector reform over at the Sada blog. They argue, “the United States must bolster its relations with nascent democratic institutions like the new parliaments and start with what many of the citizens of these countries are demanding: reform of the internal security services.”

I absolutely agree.

When folks think about supporting political reform, there is a tendency to focus on the institutions that symbolize democracy (parliaments, elections, judiciaries, etc) and the people who demand democracy (activists, journalists, politicians, etc). And of course, that focus is justifiable. But we often lose sight of other less intuitive ways in which we can promote democratic transitions – like engaging with the security services.

Egyptian Central Security Forces take a break. I watched them beat protesters a few minutes later.

A Pro-Lebanese Strategy

Today, I went to an event at USIP on Lebanon and the Arab Spring featuring Representative Charles Boustany (R-LA). I was generally impressed with Rep. Boustany, not because I agreed with everything he said, but because he approached the issues from a critical and sober perspective. Unfortunately that's all too rare when it comes to the Hill and the Middle East.

During the Q&A, I asked the Congressman: "It seems we do not have a policy on Lebanon, but rather a set of policies on Lebanese actors and institutions. We have a policy on March 14 and March 8, on the STL and on the LAF. But what is our policy on Lebanon? Does it matter we don't have one?"

Rep. Boustany responded first by clarifying that the US doesn't have policies for countries, but rather strategies. He then admitted that the US has not sufficiently developed a clear, unified strategy for Lebanon. While his speech emphasized the need to continue military assistance, broaden educational exchanges, and support parliamentary processes, among other measures, he did not explicitly delineate the strategy that these policies serve. So I'll instead say what I think.

As Rep. Boustany asserted, our primary interest in Lebanon is stability. As a weak state overwhelmed by foreign influences, Lebanon is both susceptible to externally-driven conflict as well as a catalyst to regional instability. We therefore simply cannot afford a flare up of either internal sectarian tensions or an external conflict with Israel - especially at this time of fragile democratic revolutions and a stalled peace process in the region.

It's at this point that many point the finger at Hezbollah and its alliance with Iran and Syria. To be sure, they have all had - some more consistently than others - a negative and disruptive effect on Lebanese and regional politics. But it is a mistake to therefore conclude a pro-stability strategy is an anti-Hezbollah strategy.

That's exactly what we have done in recent years. We've viewed Lebanese politics as a zero-sum game in which we must counteract Hezbollah's influence at every turn. We support its political rivals. We arm the Lebanese military. We push for the Special Tribunal on Lebanon. None of these policies is troubling in of itself. But our intentions to use these policies primarily as an anti-Hezbollah cudgel only escalates the political tensions within Lebanon and the region as a whole. We are sometimes acting - an external actor as we are - in ways that are just as intrusive as Syria and Iran.

In that sense, we are acting at cross purposes. We push against Hezbollah because they are a destabilizing force. But then we contribute to the very dynamic of foreign intervention that makes Lebanon unstable.

Instead, we must reformulate our approach to Lebanon from an anti-Hezbollah to a pro-Lebanese strategy. Many of our policies would remain exactly the same. We would still train the Lebanese military, promote civil society, support governmental institutions like the parliament, and provide economic and development assistance. But we would do so with the ultimate purpose of reinforcing the sovereignty, legitimacy and effectiveness of the Lebanese government.

A pro-Lebanese strategy would also recognize that Hezbollah represents a legitimate segment of the Lebanese population. They may have external patrons, but they are not an external actor. We can help shape the political, economic and social environment that determines Hezbollah's popularity, but no one can ever fully excise Hezbollah from Lebanon's future. Accepting this fact and acting accordingly will require political courage not only here in DC, but also in Tel Aviv and Beirut.

What will help make that pill easier to swallow is the realization that a pro-Lebanese strategy will cause considerable consternation in Damascus and Tehran. In recent years, Hezbollah has had greater difficulty balancing its dual identities as a regional resistance militia and a national socio-political movement. A pro-Lebanese strategy would exacerbate this tension within Hezbollah and help shift the balance towards the national. It may even help lead to a situation where Hezbollah's leadership will be given a stark choice by the Lebanese people: abandon your regional patrons or we will abandon you.

Moreover, unlike Iran and Syria, we can take comfort that our fundamental ideology as a nation does not ring hollow. Iran and Syria have little to offer Lebanon besides repression and economic stagnation. That's why they have no choice but to derive the majority of their influence by pitting one Lebanese faction against the others. But we can offer Lebanon a far more appealing example - one in which democracy and prosperity unite the country and ensure its stability. By adopting a pro-Lebanese strategy, we double down on our belief that our fundamental values are indeed universal - a bet I'm willing to take.

UPDATE: I recently wrote a paper on what a pro-Lebanese framework would look like for resolving the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict. It also lays out the argument in much greater detail and, more importantly, addresses the counterarguments. I'll be looking for a way to upload and link the paper shortly.

UPDATE 2: You can read the paper here (PDF).

Why I Won't Write about Bin Laden

I'm a member of the 9/11 generation. Like all Americans, we can remember exactly where we watched the Towers fall. For me, it was Mr. Flynn's world history class. But unlike all Americans, my generation was uniquely shaped by the horrors that day.We were old enough to comprehend the gravity of the attacks, but young enough that 9/11 would serve as the foundational moment of our lives.

Unlike our parents and grandparents, we could not compare what we saw and experienced that day to the other seminal moments of American and world history. Sure, we could draw facile connections to obvious analogies. But but we had no personal experience to draw upon. We were on our own to wrangle with and contextualize the raw emotions we felt.

Like many of my generation, we channeled those emotions into a desire to enter a life of public service. Some like myself focused specifically on the Middle East. We began to study Arabic, read about Islam and travel abroad in the Arab world. We did so for instrumental reasons. We wanted to learn what caused people like Osama bin Laden to murder so many innocent lives. More importantly, we wanted to help bring him to justice.

That's why, as an undergraduate, I hoped to one day become a counterterrorism intelligence analyst. I wanted to use my knowledge of the Middle East to protect the homeland. And as such, I viewed the Arab world largely as a security problem to be solved. But something unexpected happened: my interest in terrorism and Bin Laden faded.

I instead became fascinated for the Middle East for what it is: an immensely complex and diverse conglomeration of peoples, histories, religions and cultures. Terrorism may have brought me to the Middle East, but I have remained for wholly different reasons. I stayed partially because I thought I could help create a new beginning between the United States and the Arabic-speaking world. But in reality I stayed because I fell in love with the region - with the food, with the history, with the culture, and most of all with the people.

While the region is confronted by a host of profound problems, I have learned the region itself is not a problem to be solved. Rather, it is a wealth of potential to be activated. That's the main lesson we've learned from the Arab revolutions over the past few months.

That's also why I haven't written much about Al Qaeda previously on this blog and why I don't plan to start anytime soon. Others have dedicated their careers to solving the problem of Al Qaeda - and they deserve to be praised for their efforts to protect our immediate security. I, however, have turned my attention to how the U.S. can help the Middle East realize its full potential. It also just so happens that I believe that only then will the long-term threat of religious extremism  be no more.

Two years ago, I remember walking through a Muslim slum in Cairo when I spotted a faded picture of Bin Laden sticking out from a heap of garbage. Arabs have long ago thrown Al Qaeda into the refuse pile of history. They have shunned his murderous ideology for an entirely different narrative of hope, of pride, and of freedom. As we have seen these past few months, they are fighting bravely to actualize the vast potential of the region. In the words of Rachid Ghannouchi, a leading Islamist in Tunisia, on Al Jazeera today: "Bin Laden died in Tunisia before dying in Pakistan."

It is that struggle that will be the focus of this blog. Hopefully, it will also play a central role in my career. I cannot think of a better way to honor those lost on September 11th than by helping Arabs realize their inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Such an achievement will ensure that Bin Laden's photograph will forever remain rotting in that Cairo trash heap where it belongs.

Rethinking Democracy Assistance

Yesterday I went to an event at GW on "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." The three speakers,  Steven Heydemann, Eva Bellin and Ellen Lust, have all been writing about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East for years. And unfortunately, they focused mainly on that question as opposed to pivoting to the supposed topic of the day: how the US can help more effectively support democratic reform in the region.

Nonetheless, their talks reflect the importance of understanding what's happening in the region as a prerequisite for formulating effective policy. While they did not explicitly address democracy promotion, their analyses imply certain policies, some of which would be quite unorthodox.

For example, Heydemann emphasized that it's not just the opposition that learns how to better agitate for their rights, but regimes also learn how to better repress their citizens. He calls this "upgrading authoritarianism," in which regimes can become "stronger, more flexible, and more resilient" over time. Specifically in the past few months, the leaders of countries like Yemen and Syria have seen the way Ben Ali and Mubarak have been treated and learned that: 1) more violence is needed 2) if I step down, I might end up in jail or worse.

Based on Heydemann's anlaysis, democracy promotion policy should look closely at the strategic calculus of these leaders to learn how to best coax them to implement actual reforms, or when necessary, step down. This means ICC investigations of Qaddafi are counterproductive. Promises of immunity are untrustworthy. And safety in exile becomes paramount. Enhancing programs like the Mo Ibrahim Prize, which grants former African leaders a nice stipend for transferring power peacefully, would make sense. As unsavory as it sounds, offering President Saleh a mansion in the Hamptons might be more effective use of democracy promotion money than funding civil society programs.

Eva Bellin focused her analysis on the decision of the security apparatus to repress its citizens. For Bellin, so long as the military is capable and willing of shooting civilians, authoritarian regimes will survive. She provided three variables to determine willingness to shoot: the size of the protests, the nature of the protests (peaceful or violent), and finally the professionalism of the military.

This analysis suggests that US assistance to foreign militaries could actually have a democratizing effect. While such assistance undoubtedly increases the capacity to repress, if it is executed in a manner that professionalizes the military (instills institutional pride, builds national identity, weakens patrimonial ties, etc), then the military will be less willing to sacrifice its self interests by shooting civilians in revolutionary moments. Coincidentally, we are working hard to professionalize militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon. This policy prescription is quite counterintuitive, as military assistance is usually considered an example of propping up authoritarian regimes.

Finally, among other topics, Lust identified the importance of considering the variable of time. Combined with Heydemann and Bellin's emphasis on the robustness of authoritarianism, we should consider the difference between promoting democratic evolution versus democratic revolution. Currently, we hope that minor changes over time will accrue and eventually lead to democratic systems. But if authoritarian regimes are in fact so adaptive and coercive, then maybe only revolutions can bring democracy in the Middle East. In that case, why waste resources on policies designed for evolutionary change?

Now I'm not saying these policy prescriptions are what Heydemann, Bellin and Lust would prescribe. Nor am I saying I think they are correct. In fact, I think some are flat wrong, and they are wrong because they are based on flawed understandings of why the Middle East is undemocratic. But that just proves the more general point: we need to understand the region before we understand how to democratize that region. So even though this event largely ignored policy prescriptions, it still was quite useful in learning how we might formulate policy in the future.

Ice Cream and Defending Human Rights

Since our military intervention in Libya, I've heard a lot of people complaining about American inconsistency. The usual argument goes something like: Why Libya and  not Bahrain or Syria? Shouldn't we support democratic protesters everywhere?

I think this argument is misguided. For one, it's not clear why inconsistency is an argument against supporting human rights in a particular case. As Nick Kristof put it, "Isn't it better to inconsistently save some lives than to consistently save none?"

Moreover, while our actions are certainly inconsistent, it's not so clear that we arbitrarily uphold our principles.

To explain, take my unflagging craving for ice cream. I buy it whenever I can afford it. But what happens if the price of ice cream is too high? I go without. In other words, costs mediate my insatiable hunger for ice cream. When my wallet allows, I buy ice cream. When it doesn't, I don't. If someone only looks at how consistently I eat ice cream without reference to its cost and my bank account, it'll look as if I inconsistently crave ice cream. In fact, I only inconsistently purchase it.

As Joshua Foust tweeted today, there's a difference between consistency of action and consistency of principle. I agree with him that the latter is more important than the former (though he uses this distinction to still argue against the Libya intervention).

Just because we do not always intervene to protect human rights, that does not necessarily mean we do not have a consistent preference for human rights. Just as when I buy ice cream, we have to look at the costs (economic, political and military) of intervention and our ability to afford those costs.

In the case of Libya, given the domestic and international support for intervention and the impotency of Qaddafi's air defenses, military intervention was relatively inexpensive. In comparison, intervention in Syria or Bahrain would be far more expensive. Therefore, even if we consistently prefer to support democracy in both countries, there's no fault in inconsistently acting upon those preferences given the divergent costs.

That's why Denis McDonough recently explained, "We don’t make decisions about questions like intervention based on consistency or precedent. We make them based on how we can best advance our interests in the region." In other words, McDonough has no problem that our consistent pursuit of our interests will result in inconsistent actions. Nor do I.

Of course, this discussion of costs ignores two other important questions. One, even if we can afford intervention, will it be effective? And two, do we currently conceive our interests to include the democratization of the Middle East?

I would answer intervention can sometimes be effective and we should conceive democratization as our national interest. But that's clearly up to debate.

Taking Sides against Islamists?

Ray Takeyh worries in the Washington Post that the Islamists will take over the democratizing Middle East. He therefore argues the U.S. must uphold its "moral obligation of political partiality" towards secular democrats. To do so, he recommends economic aid packages and "standing with emerging secular parties and youth activists."

While I understand his concern about Islamists, his second recommendation is misguided. First, it's not clear what exactly "standing with" actually means. Presumably he means giving money and technical assistance. But it's not certain whether these groups actually want that kind of help. While Takeyh rightly reminds us that the democracy protests have not been anti-American, they really haven't been pro-American either. Rather, they have been pro-Tunisian, pro-Egyptian, pro-Bahraini, etc.

For a long time, many pro-democratic groups in the Middle East have expressed ambivalance and even rejected American support for a variety of reasons. They didn't want to be painted as pawns of external forces. They disagreed with key U.S. foreign policies. They worried about the strings attached. These worries still remain.

Second, the U.S. has made serious mistakes in the past when choosing sides. As a recent and especially damaging example, we became enamored with Ahmed Chalabi, whose machinations not only propelled us to war in Iraq, but stymied our efforts at nearly every turn after 2003. We now consider him an Iranian agent.

Third, from a more philosophical standpoint, by choosing sides in a democratic system, we oddly imply that we do not trust democracy to produce just outcomes. Too much of the debate over Islamists have focused on whether they will "moderate" in a democratic system. Instead, we should consider how successful democratic systems force a moderation of political outcomes.

In the Federalist Papers, James Madison wrote:

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

In other words, a true democratic system does not only reflect the will of the people. It also establishes checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power. Men aren't angels, and therefore rules and institutions must curb his baser instincts.
 
It is that observation that has ensured America's success as the oldest democracy in the world. It is why our system can absorb everyone from Glenn Beck to Code Pink. It is also what can ensure the building of a sound foundation for the world's newest democracies in Tunisia and Egypt.
 
Far from choosing sides, we must help the Middle East build systems that favor all sides and therefore favor no side. Legitimate constitutions. Free and fair elections. Independent judiciaries. Empowered legislatures. Unfettered press. Such institutions, if properly established and preserved, will render fears of an Islamist (or any other) takeover obsolete. Luckily, it is also exactly the kind of assistance most Arabs will accept graciously.

UNSC Resolution on Libya and Regional Strategy

The Security Council just passed a resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya. I agree wholeheartedly with Abu Muqawama's concerns here:

And while there are a lot of questions left to be answered -- Who pays for this war? Does the Congress need to authorize anything? What are the vital U.S. interests we are trying to protect? -- the question that most concerns me and pertains to readers of this blog is what happens next?

What happens if Gadhafi pulls back? Do we continue to try and press the advantage of the rebels until his government falls? Do we have the authorization to do that? Do we expect a civil war in Libya to drag out, and if so, how will we take sides? If Gadhafi falls, what comes next? What will the new Libyan government look like? Will they be friendly to U.S. interests? Someone please tell me how this ends.

All of these questions are essential. But there's one question he misses: how does intervention in Libya affect prospects for democratization in the rest of the Middle East?

While the plight of the Libyans has been no less than gut-wrenching, we cannot forget the other waves of Arabs who are making the exact same demands for their rights across the region.

Most importantly, we cannot lose sight of Tahrir Square. In every aspect - militarily, economically, politically, historically, religiously/morally - Egypt is far more important to the region than Libya. Egypt is the true domino that the rest of the region will follow. If we can help support a stable transition to a responsible and responsive government in Cairo, regardless of what happens elsewhere, we will have helped score an incredible victory for Egypt, the region, and our own interests in the long run.

We cannot become so engulfed in Libya that we lose sight of the real prize to the east. By dealing with each country on a case-by-case basis, we run exactly that risk.

That is not to say Libyans deserve freedom any less than Egyptians or anyone else. Rather, it is just the recognition of the need for a regional strategy that identifies priorities, deploys our limited resources effectively, and avoids confusion of efforts.

Lessons for Libya from the Iraqi Intifada

I wrote the following almost a week ago hoping to get it published. It wasn't. By now, both the argument and the historical analogy have been made in several places, including one that rejected my piece. Oh well, at least the idea was alright, even if the execution wasn't.

This past week the Libyan revolutionaries have suffered a series of serious setbacks. The “Brother Leader” Muammar Qaddafi has successfully pushed back the motley collection of defected soldiers, tribal militias, and untrained Libyan citizens that dare stand up for their freedom. Even the rebel stronghold of Benghazi is now under threat.

Increasingly desperate, Libya’s revolutionaries have called for military intervention to help remove their dictator. In return, they’ve only received humanitarian assistance and rhetoric.

Importantly, Libya would not be the first time a would-be Arab revolution nearly brought a dictator to his knees, only to flounder when the world failed to assist.

Nearly twenty years ago, Iraq’s Shia and Kurds rose up in an intifada that shook Saddam Hussein’s regime to the core. The uprisings took place in the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War after the American-led coalition had decimated the Iraqi military. Disgruntled soldiers fleeing from the front unleashed a torrent of anti-regime sentiment. Saddam lost control of large swaths of Iraqi territory as the people rose up in anger over decades of war, economic stagnation, political oppression, and religious repression.

President Bush even encouraged the uprisings, suggesting Iraqis should “take matters into their own hands” and overthrow Saddam. But that rhetoric never materialized into actual support. Instead, American and coalition soldiers stood by as they watched Iraqi helicopters operate with impunity on the horizon.

Thus Saddam regained his balance, crushing the rebellion methodically and brutally. Countless thousands were killed, their aspirations for a better future dying with them. To this day, Iraqis have not forgiven the U.S. for abandoning the intifada of 1991.

There were plenty of reasons for the U.S. to not assist the rebels – the fear of Iranian influence, the fragility of the military coalition, the worry that Iraq would split along sectarian lines, the unknown of what would come after Saddam, the potential cost in American lives, among others. In fact, many today praise President Bush for showing the prudence that his son would seemingly abandon in 2003.

Yet it is exactly that prudence that cemented American military involvement in Iraq for twenty years. Failing to help when the insurgency could have succeeded, the U.S. was forced to intervene once the rebellion faltered and Saddam threatened to once again massacre his own people.

Over the following two decades, the U.S. deployed troops to the Kurdish north, established no-fly zones in the north and south, trained anti-Saddam militias, supported failed coup-attempts, and bombed Iraqi targets on several occasions. On top of all of these military actions, the U.S. enforced crippling sanctions that devastated Iraq’s society and economy.

But all of these measures came only once Saddam regained his grip on power. In fact, some of these actions, such as the sanctions, perversely strengthened Saddam’s stranglehold over the country by forcing the Iraqi people to rely on the regime for survival. As such, the U.S. counterproductively decided to oust Saddam only after his removal became increasingly unlikely. Meanwhile, international resolve to maintain pressure on Saddam predictably faded and fractured over time, especially as the humanitarian toll of sanctions became increasingly pronounced.

This untenable situation of escalating tension between the U.S. and Iraq, an ever-more obstinate Saddam, and fading international support culminated with the disastrous invasion of 2003. In fact, many of America’s greatest difficulties since the invasion of Iraq, such as widespread distrust of our intentions, the absolute collapse of key infrastructure, and the comatose economy, are all remnants of the policy decisions made since the abandonment of the 1991 intifada.

So what lessons can we learn from our experiences in Iraq to help guide us with Libya?

First, if we do decide to intervene, we must do it now. With each passing day, the revolution loses momentum and Qaddafi reasserts his power. The longer we wait to intervene, the harder it will be to remove Qaddafi. If we make the same mistake as we did in Iraq by intervening only after Qaddafi regains the initiative, we will pay the cost in blood and treasure.

Second, if we decide against intervention, we must plan for the humanitarian consequences. Like Saddam, Qaddafi won’t stop his counter-revolution when the rebels put down their arms. He will seek to squash, in his words, every “rat” and “cockroach” he can find. In Iraq, millions of refugees fled to neighboring countries, especially Iran and Turkey. As more Libyans flee to already-beleaguered Egypt and Tunisia, we will have to increase our assistance.

Third, beyond the humanitarian consequences of non-intervention, we must also prepare for dealing with an angry, resurgent Qaddafi who will not forget that President Obama demanded his resignation. The so-called reformed Qaddafi who abandoned his nuclear program and cooperated with counterterrorism efforts will be no more. In his place, we will once again deal with the rogue Qaddafi who blew up planes over Lockerbie and nightclubs in Germany, who befriended dictators like Idi Amin, and who trained ruthless militias globally.

It is that Qaddafi, whom President Reagan dubbed the “mad dog of the Middle East,” we felt to obligated to occasionally bomb and sanction. Just like Saddam, he will present a persistent threat to our interests and security. Moreover, we will risk entering an escalating cycle of tension, threats and violence that could lead to war and fracture international support – an all too familiar dynamic we must avoid.

Just as with the Iraqi intifada, there are many reasons to reject military intervention. We don’t really know who the rebels are. We don’t know what comes after Qaddafi. We don’t want to risk American lives and spend American money. We don't want a war in yet another Muslim-majority country. But the most important reason may soon be that we already missed our chance to remove Qaddafi when we could. If that is the case, then we will have to learn to live with the ramifications.

Trading Settlements for Gilad Shalit

Some of what I plan to post here will actually be op ed and letter to editor submissions that were not published. Here's one I wrote way back in October about trading a settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier imprisoned by Hamas.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu should publicly offer to extend the settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held hostage by Hamas. Whether Hamas says yes or no, Netanyahu will come out the winner.

Despite the best efforts of the Obama administration, the current round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has reached an impasse. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refuses to negotiate so long as Israel continues to build settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Netanyahu claims domestic politics precludes him from extending the freeze, especially after the Palestinians failed to negotiate until the waning weeks of the original freeze.

The Obama administration hasn’t given up hope yet. It has offered Netanyahu a package of incentives to reinstate the freeze while pressuring Abbas to acquiesce to some compromise less than a complete freeze. But neither side seems ready to budge.

Therefore, the ultimate success of these negotiations currently hinges upon Netanyahu’s willingness and ability to surmount right-wing opposition to extending the settlement freeze. For negotiations to continue, Netanyahu needs new sources of domestic support. More pessimistically, Netanyahu also needs a scapegoat should negotiations collapse.

A public offer to Hamas to exchange a settlement freeze for the release of Gilad Shalit would achieve both of those ends.

In the summer of 2006, Hamas militants crossed the Israel-Gaza border and kidnapped then-Corporal Shalit. Mounting international pressure, multiple military clashes, and several rounds of negotiations have all failed to bring Shalit home. Currently, Hamas demands the release of approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit’s freedom.

That is a tough pill to swallow for many Israelis, who balk at the large number of prisoners and fear that such a deal would encourage further kidnappings. But at the same time, the Gilad saga has resonated deeply within Israeli society. Nearly every Israeli household has some father, mother, son, or daughter serving in the military and can only too well imagine the tragedy that has befallen the Shalit family. If there is any cause that could rally Israelis to support a settlement freeze, it is the freedom of Gilad Shalit.

Plus, Israel has already shown a willingness to seek creative solutions with its offer to extend the freeze in exchange for Jonathan Pollard, the Israeli convicted of spying against the U.S.

Unfortunately, it is not clear Hamas would be interested in a Gilad-for-freeze deal. Through Gilad, they gain leverage over the Israeli government. It is unlikely Hamas would want to give up that leverage for the sake of a peace process sponsored by their Palestinian rivals. They much rather force Israel to release Hamas members from prison. Or just as likely, they might simply prefer to maintain a state of tension with Israel to build popular support for their armed resistance platform.

Yet Hamas would refuse the deal at its own peril. Palestinians desire an independent state above all else. The building of settlements precludes the realization of their aspirations in the most tangible of ways: the physical usurpation of the land of their future nation. Moreover, these negotiations represent the best chance for Palestinians to achieve statehood in the near-term.
Hamas would be left with a stark choice. Should they do what’s best for their organization and refuse the deal? Or should they do what’s best for Palestinians and release Shalit? Palestinians would be watching carefully to see where Hamas’ true interests lie.

Moreover, a Hamas refusal would allow Netanyahu to displace much of the blame for the negotiations collapsing. In this way, Netanyahu wins whether Hamas says yes or no. Either negotiations go forward or Hamas gets the blame.

This win-win situation works whether Netanyahu truly desires peace or not, a matter of contentious debate. Assuming Hamas would refuse the deal, Netanyahu could cynically make the offer to solely create a scapegoat that would obscure his own insincerity. If by some surprise Hamas does accept the deal, Netanyahu could easily find other obstacles to peace beyond settlement building.

For that reason, the United States should exert pressure to ensure that such an offer is extended with sincerity and that any resulting freeze is both comprehensive and durable. Moreover, the U.S. cannot allow such an offer to preclude other avenues that might allow talks to progress. President Obama must continue to think creatively about how the U.S. can prod, bribe, and compel the parties to return to the negotiating table. A trade of a settlement freeze for Gilad Shalit’s freedom is only one among many options.

What Can We Learn from Iran?

There is no doubt that America faces a health care crisis. According to The Times, "the Mississippi Delta has some of the worst health statistics in the country, including infant mortality rates for non-whites at Third World levels." In fact, Mississippi has the country's highest rates of child obesity, hypertension, and teenage pregnancy, with over 20% of the population uninsured. And yet, the state spends the third most per capita on health expenditures in the country.

Clearly, Mississippi needs help - and they can't wait for Washington to stop bickering with itself and finally pass health care reform. So, they have turned elsewhere...to Iran.

As the article explains, after the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government launched a program that set up "health houses" to serve local communities. Ordinary citizens known as behvarz received health training and would travel around offering advice and basic medical services. The program was wildly successful, reducing child mortality rates by 69% and maternal mortality rates dropped from 300 per 100,000 births to 30. Currently, there are 17,000 health houses throughout Iran, serving 90% of Iran's rural population of 23 million people.

A group representing a rural hospital in Mississippi learned of Iran's success story, formed a partnership with Shiraz University, and sent a delegation to Iran to learn more about the program. In turn, Iranian experts visited Mississippi to help advise the opening of the state's first health house, due to open next month. Better yet, the first American behvarz health assistants will be trained in Iran next spring.

Beyond the obvious fact that we shouldn't have to look to Iran to resolve our health crisis, it is comforting that we can. But it wasn’t easy. As the article explains, the Mississippi group had to request special permission from the Treasury Department to avoid sanctions restrictions, as well as skirt potential political sensitivities. Oddly, even the Mississippi governor hasn't been informed of the program!

Obviously, some people would feel uncomfortable dealing with Iran, our political adversary that sponsors terrorism and likely seeks to develop nuclear weapons. But too often we confuse the government of Iran with its people. As the Green Movement has clearly shown, the actions and rhetoric of a dictatorial government reveals nothing about its people.

That is why labels like the "Axis of Evil" confuse more than they clarify. Though Ahmadinejad and Khamenei may be the true Great Satans, the Iranian people are anything but demons. In fact, they simply seek the same rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that Americans cherish. Just as they take comfort in our moral support for their struggle for freedom, we should take comfort in their ability and willingness to help improve American lives.

More generally, America's obsession with our own exceptionalism might prove a philosophical roadblock to accepting Iranian assistance . We have always believed our country should be a city upon a hill, an exemplar for all other countries to follow. We have also held the inverse to be true as well: America should not be a follower. Such logic is the source for much of the neoconservative critique of President Obama's foreign policy that complains Obama treats America as a partner, and not a hegemon, in the international system.

But such arguments misinterpret why America is an exceptional country. It is not because we are objectively better than the rest of the world. Plenty of indices of wealth, happiness, healthiness, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press prove otherwise. Rather, we are exceptional as the first nation in history to be defined by what we believe in, not who we are or where we are from.

As our Constitution states, we established our government “in order to form a more perfect union.” The implication is our union is not yet perfect, our city upon the hill is not yet finished. For over two centuries, we have tirelessly built upon our city to form a more perfect union, using our ideals as a blueprint and our progress as our brick and mortar.

That is why we are an exceptional nation. That is why the world looks up to us. That is why we should not be scared to confront our shortcomings. And that is why we should not only accept, but actively seek help from others - even from Iran.

As we consider imposing enhanced sanctions on the Iranian regime, we should not only seek to minimize the harm inflicted upon the Iranian people. We must also consider the opportunity cost in lost cultural, educational, and technical exchanges that would benefit Iranians and Americans alike.

Egyptian Democracy When Pigs Fly

Last week, I went to an event hosted by the Wilson Center that featured Egyptian journalist Heba el-Koudsy discussing American democracy promotion in Egypt. You can see a summary of the event here. Or, for the more visually-inclined, the video is available online here.


During her lecture, el-Koudsy differentiated between external American and internal Egyptian pressure for reform. She argued it has always been the internal push for reform that has prodded President Mubarak into (insufficient) action. As such, the U.S. should focus on ways to support the internal drive for democratization by, for example, bolstering civil society.


At minute 53, I asked her how the potential candidacy Mohamed ElBaradei may provide a new source of internal leverage for reform on the Mubarak regime.

To give a quick background, Egypt will be holding its second-ever multi-party competitive elections for president in 2011. All experts agree that the presidency will remain in Mubarak's hands through manipulation and coercion. The only question is whether it'll be Hosni or his son Gamal who will be the Mubarak in charge.

Enter Elbaradei. Currently, he enjoys broad popularity in Egypt for his service as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. As such, the Wafd party - one of the oldest parties in Egypt and considered an opposition party - asked the historically apolitical ElBaradei to run as their candidate for president.


After mulling it over, ElBaradei announced he would only run in the very unlikely scenario that elections were "free and fair." Shortly after that announcement, he upped the ante again, declaring he would only run as an independent candidate. To translate for you, he basically said he'd run for president when pigs fly.

The Egyptian constitution, while technically allowing independent candidates to run for president, sets an overwhelming number of restrictions and qualifications on an independent candidacy. To give a domestic example, imagine if a candidate declared he/she would only run for president if the electoral college were abolished, and even then, as neither a Democrat or Republican. That's what ElBaradei is doing.

In short, it won't ever happen under the current constitution. And more importantly, everyone - including ElBaradei and Mubarak - know it will never happen. And yet, according to El-Koudsy, something is happening.

Egyptians are no longer only talking about Mubarak versus Mubarak. ElBaradei's announcement has stimulated Egypt's political conscious, sparking new debate and revealing new possibilities. But most importantly, Mubarak's farcical and cynical use of democratic institutions to mask his dictatorship have been laid bare. And that's exactly what ElBaradei sought to achieve by effectively refusing to participate in sham elections.

During his tenure as IAEA chief, he scoured the deserts of Iraq in search for the mythical weapons of mass destruction and negotiated endlessly with the intransigent Iranian regime. Now as an Egyptian politician, he seems to be prepared to put those experiences to good use: to continue chasing fantasy while tirelessly confronting an uncompromising regime.

And if he and other Egyptians persist, maybe one day that fantasy will be fantasy no more.

How Incursions Become Invasions

Yesterday, 11 Iranian soldiers crossed the Iraqi border and raised the Iranian flag over a disputed oil well.

The Iraqi government, after first denying the incident, promised that it will seek a diplomatic solution to the problem. The Iranians have rejected Iraq's demands for it to withdraw, denying any problem at all because the oil well "belongs to Iran." The U.S. military called the incursion a "sovereignty issue" and noted that such incidents are frequent along the Iraq-Iran border.

Well, seeing how no one else seems all that worried, I'll cautiously sound the alarm for them. This is a small, non-violent incident. But it's a small, non-violent incident that can easily become a not-so-small, violent one.

First of all, Iraq and Iran have never gotten over the Iran-Iraq War that killed over a million people in eight years of brutal fighting and civilian bombing. Admittedly, since the fall of Saddam and the empowerment of the Shia, the Iraq government has become much more friendly with Iran. However, Iraq is also experiencing a resurgence of nationalism. An Iranian incursion into their land, given all their strained history and all the other problems Iraqis currently face from external meddling, won't be received well by most Iraqis.

According to Shiite politician Ayad Jamal Aldin, "The world need [sic] to know that unless strong action is taken against Tehran, Iraq will simply become another Iranian colony which will threaten stability throughout the middle east." Clearly, Iraqis have not endured nearly 7 years of violence to give up their sovereignty to the Iranians.

Second, the Iranian regime is looking for a distraction - any distraction - from its internal upheaval. Tehran is especially nervous now that the holy months of Muharram and Safar have begun. As Mehdi Khalaji explains, the opposition will be able to use the annual religious ceremonies to protest the regime, but the government will be given the impossible dilemma of either cracking down on religious displays or allowing two months of unrestrained protest.

As such, the government is looking for any national cause that could tie to the Iranian people together - whether that be confrontation with the U.S., Israel, or Iraq is immaterial, so long as there's confrontation. Keep in mind here that Ayatollah Khomeini solidified his power during the Iran-Iraq War, using it as an excuse to imprison and assassinate thousands of his political enemies.

Third and most importantly, it only takes one itchy trigger-finger, one accidental misfire, one irresponsible private, to transform an "incursion" into an "invasion." Remember that the American Revolution did not begin with a decision to go to war, but by an unknown militiaman who fired the "shot heard 'round the world" in the impromptu Battles of Lexington and Concord.

So while this small incident will likely blow over, I'll be crossing my fingers until it does.

Should We Forget the Iranians?

For the second time this year, the Iranian people have spoken through the ballot box. And once again, their voice was not heard.

As Michelle Moghtader over at niacINsight explains, Time Magazine has given the shaft to the Iranian people. According to Moghtader, more than 536,000 people voted that the Iranian protesters should be named Person of the Year, outnumbering the second and third runners up combined. Yet not only did Time overlook the Iranian protesters for Person of the Year, they didn't even include them on the shortlist of runners up.

Admittedly, Time never promised to adhere to the online poll and one could certainly argue that the eventual winner, Ben Bernanke, deserves the title. Nonetheless, to not even include the Iranian protesters on the shortlist seems, in the words of Moghtader, nothing short of "disheartening."

She continues:

Perhaps Time didn’t realize the impact that this award could have had for the Iranian people [...]Honoring them would have shown Iran that the world is still watching; as a result, putting pressure on the government to reform its behavior. The Iranian people want to be part of the international community, but how can they, especially if we fail to recognize them?

While I'm not certain it's the role of Time to make political points, they certainly missed an opportunity to make a difference in the lives of all Iranian people. I can't imagine what it's like to face down baton-wielding basij in the street, but I can imagine what it's like to know that you're not alone in this struggle for freedom, to know that the world is with you against tyranny.

Person of the Year or not, Iranians must know America is with them. All Americans have watched the Iranian people in their struggle for the very rights we have struggled for throughout our history: to live our lives, to enjoy our liberties, and to pursue our happiness.

Yet at the same time, I am concerned that we Americans might act brashly in a clumsy attempt to show our solidarity. Or even worse, some policymakers might seek to use the righteous cause of the Iranian people for unrighteous ends.

Already, the House has overwhelmingly passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act that Iran experts know won't work and the Green Movement has rejected as harmful to the Iranian people. Meanwhile, some are calling "the case for using force in Iran [...] a slam dunk." It's hard to imagine how the Iranian opposition could benefit from not being able to heat their homes, let alone when bombs are falling on their heads.

Of course, there are more nuanced and thoughtful policy ideas out there, but it's not clear that reason will win the day. Given the choice between doing something harmful and doing nothing at all, we must choose the latter. Ultimately, if America cannot express our solidarity wisely, then perhaps it would be better if, like Time Magazine, we forget all about the Iranian protesters.

For those interested, I lay out three principles for how we should proceed with Iran in a previous post here.

Failed Iran Op Ed

I recently wrote this op-ed and submitted it to the Baltimore Sun. It was rejected. So, now it's posted here instead. For those who are interested, the historical background comes from this fascinating article by Muhammad Sahimi at Tehran Bureau

Americans have learned many things about Iran these past few months. We’ve learned of the brutality of the baton-wielding Basij and the courage of the Iranian citizens who bear the brunt of their blows. We’ve learned of the cruelty of Evin Prison’s interrogators and the perseverance of the victims who endure their torture. We’ve learned of the ruthlessness of the hollow regime in Tehran and the strength of the opposition who demand their fundamental rights.

We have also learned about the utter complexity of Iranian politics. Take, for example, Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, who Muhammad Sahimi at the Tehran Bureau calls “the power behind the scene” of the opposition movement.

The regime clearly wants to silence Khoeiniha. Yet given his impeccable revolutionary credentials, the regime cannot do so without revealing how ideologically hollow they have become. Khoeiniha served as one of Ayatollah Khomeini's most trusted advisers. Furthermore, it was Khoeiniha who gave approval to the students of the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OCU) to storm the American embassy on November 4, 1979. To this day, Khoeiniha proudly keeps a filing cabinet in his office that reads "Property of the General Services Administration" of the United States.

Most interestingly, two students on the OCU board opposed the decision to take over the American embassy. Instead, they argued that the students should target the Soviet Embassy (at this time, Communists were still influential throughout Iran). In an ironic twist of history, one of those dissenters was none other than current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This history lesson should give pause to any American foreign policymaker. Iranian politics are incredibly complex, constantly evolving and frustratingly opaque. Even if we do have experts who understand its subtleties, and that's a big if, any nuanced analysis is likely lost as information is passed up the chain of command.

At a recent event on Capitol Hill, Brookings Institution expert Kenneth Pollack warned the audience that we must not try to meddle in internal Iranian affairs, especially given the difficulty in understanding all of its nuances. We simply don't understand how to intervene successfully. When we have tried in the past, such as supporting the Shah's coup in 1953, we only have laid the foundation for anti-Americanism, extremism and regime paranoia.

But at the same time, we cannot ignore the struggle for Iranian democracy as we negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program. No matter the checkered past of the opposition leaders, the Green Movement presents the best opportunity for a prosperous and stable Iran in the long-term, an Iran that will no longer poses a strategic threat to the United States and its allies.

Moving forward, U.S. policymakers should therefore follow three guidelines:

1. Listen to the Iranian people. None of the information above is news to the Iranian people. They know the history of their leaders and what implications those histories may entail. Where we are ignorant, they are knowledgeable. Where we are cumbersome, they are agile. Quite simply, they know what works and what doesn't. Admittedly, it will be sometimes difficult to determine what the Iranians want - they will often disagree and debate amongst themselves. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn't listen and learn as best we can.

2. Do no harm. Ultimately, this struggle belongs to the Iranians. They must answer the tough questions and take the bold actions. They have done so already and will continue to do so, as shown most recently by the protests on November 4th. We can help when it is clear our assistance is both needed and wanted. We must not rush policy for the appearance of solidarity, but rather we must carefully consider how our actions will impact the interests of the Iranian people. When the result is in doubt, doing less is better than doing harm.

3. Bolster institutions and processes, not personalities. It is exceedingly difficult to determine who in Iran deserves American support. It would be hard to explain why opposition leaders like Ayatollah Khoeiniha deserve our assistance, given his pedigree. Nor is his case special. Many of the opposition leaders, including Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, held high level government positions as the regime executed thousands of political prisoners in the 1980s. But even if we did find leaders deserving of support, it is unclear how the U.S. can substantively help them without risking their reputations as independent politicians free of foreign influence.

Instead, the U.S. should look to support efforts to strengthen the institutions and processes that uphold all healthy democracies - a free press, a thriving civil society, an independent judiciary, electoral safeguards and the rule of law. By bolstering Iranian democracy without elevating specific personalities, the U.S. can avoid most charges of meddling while exposing those who would deny the Iranian people their inalienable right of self-determination.

No Longer the Greatest Great Satan

Is America no longer the greatest Great Satan? While Iran’s Supreme Leader still froths at the mouth, the Iranian people has had enough with his hate speeches. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda is now spewing their spiteful rhetoric at someone else besides America for once. This week, the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula declared Shi’ite Iran a greater threat than either the Jews or Christians. But most intriguingly, Al Qaeda has also set its sight on a new, rising threat: China.

This past year, the Chinese government has cracked down on their Uighur population, a Muslim minority group several million strong. This brutal treatment of Muslims provoked a surge of angry reactions throughout the Muslim world. The plight of the Uighurs cuts particularly deep for historical and ideological reasons.

Historically, China hosts a long and storied Muslim tradition, beginning when the Caliph Uthman sent an emissary to the Chinese Emperor in 650 AD, only 18 years after the Prophet Mohammed's death. In fact,while touring Xi’an, I spoke Arabic with several Chinese Muslims in a famous mosque built in the early 8th century. Eventually, Muslims ascended to high positions of power, such as the renown Muslim explorer Zheng He. Thus for Chinese Muslims to be persecuted in the 21st century is especially bitter.

Ideologically, Chinese Communism (or Red Capitalism if you prefer) is nothing short of morally bankrupt in the Muslim point of view. The Chinese ideological system is founded entirely upon material wealth and the physical world. Islam, on the other hand, shirks physical goods in favor of the spiritual hereafter. After all, what is this life worth when the Garden is promised in the next? Worse yet, not only do the Chinese worship the false idol of money, they are irrevocably atheistic. While Islam sets aside a special place for the monotheistic faiths of Judaism and Christianity, Eastern faiths are utter anathema.

In comparison, the United States boasts five million Muslims citizens who share equal rights, expounds Islamic-friendly principles like freedom, equality and justice to temper the excesses of capitalism, and remains a deeply religious, monotheistic country. For every complaint Al Qaeda harbors against America – our abuse of Muslims, our worship of money and our general godlessness – China commits the same sins to an even greater extreme. Thus it is no surprise that Al Qaeda leaders have declared jihad against Beijing.

The ultra-nationalistic Chinese were likely taken aback by this declaration of universal holy war. The government in Beijing believes, as they only source of legitimate authority within China, that they have the political prerogative to treat their citizens as they please. Any international forces, whether it be Al Qaeda or the UN, have no business intruding upon Chinese sovereignty. But no matter how hard China strains to maintain their sovereignty, they will eventually have to accept that in a globalizing world, there is no longer such a thing as a purely internal matter.

This new fact of life will grow increasingly important as China seeks a greater economic role in the Middle East. According to Ambassador Chas Freeman, by 2020 China will conduct $350-500 billion in trade annually with the region (the U.S. currently does $70 billion). With an increased economic role, politics will inexorably follow.

I would recommend that all Chinese leaders (and you too) should read Michael Oren’s Power, Faith and Fantasy on the history of American foreign policy in the Middle East. As a new player in the Middle East, the United States originally enjoyed both popularity and trust. But as we grew increasingly entangled economically and politically, we inevitably lost our luster. China should take heed. Al Qaeda already has.

Sanctioning Shalom

According to Deena Jawhar in the Middle East International, Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament has unanimously passed a bill sanctioning all contact with Israelis. If also passed by the upper house, a simple Shalom could result in fines up to $25,000 or five years of imprisonment.

Jawhar explains that while Bahrain's government (read: King Hamad) does not officially recognize Israel, it has taken several measures in recent years such as

the closure of an Israel boycott office in 2005; a proposal by the foreign minister last year to establish a regional forum including Israel; a call for dialogue with Israelis made by Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin-Hamad in a Washington Post article published in July; and King Hamad's regular meetings with pro-Israel groups during trips abroad.

As such, the King views the bill as an affront to his prerogative to formulate foreign policy. In fact, the crown prince has argued that normalisation with Israel could bring economic benefits to the country - an argument to which the lower house of parliament and its constituents obviously don't give much credence. However, the upper house may have little choice but to follow the government's line, given that they are appointed by the King himself. Therefore, it is unlikely the bill will ever become a law.

This episode serves as a reminder about how deeply and pervasively hatred towards Israel flows through the Arab world. I can understand why Arabs feel so strongly about the plight of the Palestinian people. I can even comprehend why, at the cost of their own economic welfare, the Bahraini parliament is willing to shoot symbolic salvos at Tel Aviv. But what I don't understand - and what I don't think they have considered - is how their anger also hurts the very people they ostensibly seek to help.

An Israel that feels under siege will not and cannot make peace. Nor is there any shortage of reasons for Israel to feel in danger. If not Hamas, then Hezbollah. If not Hezbollah, then Iran. Then let's not forget Syria. Oh, and al Qaeda-inspired Sunni splinter groups. So does Israel need to feel threatened by Bahrain's lower house of parliament? No, but it's just simply one more excuse to retreat into a psychological bunker.

For there to be a political peace, there must first be a minimum level of mutual trust and mutual confidence. And there can be neither trust nor confidence without contact between the Arabs and Israelis. That is why it is so essential, as President Obama has urged, for both sides to offer gradual confidence-building measures to undergird any political negotiations.

But episodes like these make me wonder whether the anger is simply too great right now to move forward. While President Obama was correct to make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a top priority from the get-go, it might now be better for everyone to take a breather and try again after tempers have cooled.

Rivals, Not Enemies

Per Laura Rozen at Politico, Ambassador John Limbert has been named the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran at the State Department. Thirty years ago, Limbert was taken hostage during the Tehran embassy takeover and held for fourteen months, much of it in solitary confinement. After his release, he continued to serve in the Foreign Service for 33 years and was awarded the Distinguished Service Award.

Given the next year will have serious implications for not only US-Iranian relations but the Middle East as a whole, it is obvious why State would want to bring Limbert back on board. As Rozen explains, "Limbert is one of the few U.S. diplomats to have actually served in Tehran and who speaks the language fluently."

And speak the langauge fluently he does. Not only is he a scholar of medieval Persian poetry, he employs pun and wordplay with ease. Take, for instance, this video of Limbert and Khamenei during the hostage crisis at the niacINsight blog. Limbert quips about the Iranian concept of "taarof" or hospitality, telling Khamenei: "Iranians are too hospitable to guests in their country, when we insist that we must be going, you tell us 'no, no, you must stay.'"

In another example, I recently attended a conference on Capitol Hill hosted by the National Iranian American Council in which Limbert participated. During his remarks, he made a pun in Farsi, sparking laughter amongst the Iranians in the room. The rest of us, wondering what just happened, chuckled quietly to not feel left out.

But his language skills, while impressive, are not as important as the analysis he'll bring to his office. At the NIAC conference, he emphasized three critical points. First, the U.S. must not narrowly focus on the nuclear issue, but instead must broaden the negotiations to focus on the issues Iranians care about as well. If we only demand our objectives and not listen to theirs, we will not succeed in achieving anything.

Second, he emphasized the importance of patience. During the hostage negotiations, the basic deal to release him and the other hostages was hammered out four months before the final release. But it is difficult to turn agreed principles into action. If the U.S. had imposed artificial deadlines on the Iranians, the negotiations would have failed and he may never have been freed.

Third, by seeking to engage the regime, President Obama has presented Khamenei with a real dilemma. For the past 30 years, American has been the Great Satan. But now that Obama has recast the US-Iran relationship as a rivalry and not a Manichean struggle between enemies, Khamenei is forced to rationalize his continued demonization of the U.S. Eventually, such efforts will discredit the regime.

The question is why did the State Department choose him? Is it only because he speaks the language and has experience? Or is it because of the policies he proffers? Obviously both are important, but it is unclear how well his voice will be heard over the din of the policy debate. But at the very least, I'm glad he'll be in the middle of the fray.