Fishy Figures about USAID

Nothing worries me more about the future of Egypt than its economy. The White House seems to agree. The budgetary atmosphere in DC rules out a new Marshall Plan. Still, we have forgiven $1 billion of Egyptian debt, spearheaded further efforts at the G8, established an enterprise fund, created a regional trade and investment initiative, conducted entrepreneurship exchange programs, and cultivated private sector ties between our two countries.

But many of our efforts are viewed with suspicion by Egyptian revolutionaries - especially those with leftist leanings. They worry that the US has ulterior motives, that we seek to subvert the revolution to our economic interests. They look at previous interventions of the IMF and World Bank and - not entirely unjustifiably - worry about social unrest from economic upheaval.

One of the main goals of our public diplomacy in post-revolutionary Egypt must be to convince the public that many of their fears are unfounded. A majority of Arabs conflate democracy with economic outcomes. If Egypt's economy tanks, so will the aspirations of Tahrir Square. The US must do what it can to help ensure that does not happen. That first requires convincing Egyptians to let us help.

That is why this article in Al Masry Al Youm is so damaging. The English version claims that over the past 30 years, 90% of the $6 billion dollars given to Egypt by USAID has been "misused." The Arabic version gives a more detailed and slightly different account. It clarifies the $6 billion refers to aid for democracy and human rights assistance, not all assistance, but maintains the claim 90% of those funds were wasted. Among other figures, it also claims USAID gave $344 million for economic development in 2009 - implying such assistance has not helped dent Egypt's high rates of poverty, hunger and disease because of waste.

These numbers originate from a report by the "Center for Economic Studies" (I have yet to find the original report). Although the article cites an anonymous government official who denies these figures, the article clearly will confirm the widespread skepticism over American assistance.

The problem is these numbers don't add up with American statistics. According to the USAID mission in Egypt, the agency has given $28.6 billion between 1975-2009, not $6 billion. So the English version of the article is clearly wrong. According to the same source, democracy and governance assistance for that period has accounted for 4% of USAID funds ($1.144 billion), so the Arabic version's clarification of the $6 billion figure is also wrong. Moreover, according to this report by the Congressional Research Service, the entire US government (not just USAID) gave $250 million in economic assistance in 2009, not $344 million as the article claims.

If such basic facts are wrong, how we can trust the claim that 90% of USAID funds were wasted? Now I'm sure we waste a lot of money over there, but that number just seems fishy to me.

Unfortunately, it wouldn't sound so fishy to many Egyptians. And that's our problem. I hope we push back against this article and set the record straight.

*Thanks to @bungdan, @nervana_1 and @stevenacook for their help on this post.

The May 27th Gamble

May 27th could prove the most important day for the Egyptian revolution since Mubarak's resignation. This Friday, a coalition of revolutionaries have called for a million-man protest. They hope to spark, in their own words, a second Egyptian revolution.

This confrontational strategy is fraught with risks. Of course, the protests will anger the military council ruling Egypt, which cares about stability above all else. But perhaps more worrisome, the protests could further fracture Egyptian society.

We all marveled at the stunning unity of the Egyptian people in Tahrir Square during the revolution. Young and old, Muslim and Christian, rich and poor, urban and rural all chanted together, "The people want the fall of the regime." But as many analysts warned, once those chants became reality, the unity would begin to disintegrate. So it has.

Since Mubarak's resignation, several fractures have become visible. The call for massive protests on May 27th could exacerbate all of them.

First, sectarian tensions between Christian and Muslims have bubbled over on several occasions. As Michael Hanna points out, these tensions "have deep roots in recent Egyptian history [and] may be the most urgent test of how much Egypt has actually changed since the fall of Hosni Mubarak." Violence has prompted some Christians to voice nostalgia for the security of the Mubarak era, and in a few extreme cases, they have even called for foreign intervention. For the first time, we've seen Christians protest separately from those demonstrating in Tahrir Square.

These tensions are even visible in the Egyptian-American community. A recent conference I attended devolved into a shouting match between Christians and Muslims before one well-respected community leader defused the situation with a timely joke.

While the May 27th protest leaders have called on all Egyptians, Muslim and Christian, to descend upon Tahrir Square, they oddly have not included anything concerning religious freedom and tolerance in their list of demands (in Arabic here). For many Christians (and Egypt's other religious minorities), silence on the issue implies acquiescence to the unacceptable status quo.


Second, the debate over the role of Islam in politics has also caused divisions within Egyptian society. Most visibly, Salafists have been behind much of the sectarian troubles in recent months. The Muslim Brotherhood, though it has condemned the violence, has not quelled fears about its ultimate intentions. Mixed messages abound. For example, even though the Brotherhood's new political party includes Christian leadership, it also plans to work closely with Salafi political parties in the upcoming elections.

The May 27th protests will have to recruit their million men and women without the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has refused to participate. As one of the best organized organizations in Egypt, the Brotherhood sees an interest in holding elections as soon as possible and therefore does not want any major disturbances to delay the electoral schedule.

Yet the Brotherhood also initially refused to officially participate in the January 25th revolution. If the protests gather momentum, they may change their mind about May 27th as well. Moreover, it's not clear they will be able to maintain their own unity. Just as they did in the January 25th revolutions, youth members of the movement may join the protests without official permission, further contributing to a generational divide within the organization. Finally, the May 27th protests may further split the interests of the estranged Brotherhood member who has declared his candidacy for president against the wishes of the leadership.

Third, different revolutionary priorities have also led to disagreement. On May 15th, a largely secular crowd protested in front of the Israeli embassy in commemoration of what they call the Nakba, or the "catastrophe" of the founding of Israel and the coerced migration of Palestinians. For many Egyptians, the protests and resulting crackdown was an unnecessary distraction from Egypt's tremendous internal problems. As the blogger Zeinobia put it, May 15th "was truly Nakba for all Egypt, no one won as everybody lost." That is not to say Palestine isn't important to Egyptians or to the Egyptian revolution, as this post by Hossam el-Hamalawy clearly shows. But rather, many simply feel now is not the right time to stir up yet another hornet's nest.

Instead, people like Wael Ghonim have urged the revolutionaries to focus on the economic conditions of the country. Underlying this argument is a valid concern that the revolution has lost touch with the needs and aspirations of the average Egyptian who cares more about bread than abstract political rights.

Tellingly, the May 27th organizers have placed the economy at the top of their agenda. However, their demands take a clear ideological turn to the left. They call for the establishment of a minimum and maximum wage, "the distribution of wealth to rescue the country from economic crisis," price controls, progressive tax schedules, and the prosecution of corrupt businessmen to recover ill-gained earnings.

Putting aside the question of what would objectively best serve Egypt's economy, the socialist slant of these demands may alienate certain segments of the Egyptian society who would otherwise participate on May 27th. For example, there is no mention of the need to promote economic growth through investment, trade and tourism or how protests would serve those ends. In addition, the question of foreign assistance will prove an obstacle to unity. As business magnate and newly-minted politician Naguib Sawiris in favor of such assistance tweeted recently, "busy writing the economic program of our party, not sure left wingers will like it!" But the thought of foreign assistance disgusts many Egyptians, such as Gigi Ibrahim who likened it to "shackles."

All of these issues - sectarianism, Islamism and revolutionary priorities - combine to form significant obstacles for the May 27th protests by draining possible sources of support. Unfortunate in-fighting between the revolutionaries, sparked by a mixture of jealousy and policy disagreement, has also hampered unity. But the greatest hurdle may simply be public fatigue. For months, Egyptians have lived on the edge. They were willing to balance on that edge to overthrow Mubarak. But with so many fault lines running through Egyptian society, it is unclear they are willing to continue to do so on May 27th. Nor is it clear that the demands of the May 27th protests can best be achieved on the street.

I am sure the May 27th organizers have carefully considered these questions, weighed the pros and cons, and decided to take a massive risk. They may succeed in sparking a second revolution that will bring true change to Egypt. Or they may drastically fail and even irrevocably tarnish the cadre of revolutionaries who led the way on January 25th. We will know Friday whether their gamble will pay off.

UPDATE: A blogger I cite above, Zeinobia, has translated the list of demands for May 27th and added her own commentary here.

Rethinking Democracy Assistance

Yesterday I went to an event at GW on "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." The three speakers,  Steven Heydemann, Eva Bellin and Ellen Lust, have all been writing about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East for years. And unfortunately, they focused mainly on that question as opposed to pivoting to the supposed topic of the day: how the US can help more effectively support democratic reform in the region.

Nonetheless, their talks reflect the importance of understanding what's happening in the region as a prerequisite for formulating effective policy. While they did not explicitly address democracy promotion, their analyses imply certain policies, some of which would be quite unorthodox.

For example, Heydemann emphasized that it's not just the opposition that learns how to better agitate for their rights, but regimes also learn how to better repress their citizens. He calls this "upgrading authoritarianism," in which regimes can become "stronger, more flexible, and more resilient" over time. Specifically in the past few months, the leaders of countries like Yemen and Syria have seen the way Ben Ali and Mubarak have been treated and learned that: 1) more violence is needed 2) if I step down, I might end up in jail or worse.

Based on Heydemann's anlaysis, democracy promotion policy should look closely at the strategic calculus of these leaders to learn how to best coax them to implement actual reforms, or when necessary, step down. This means ICC investigations of Qaddafi are counterproductive. Promises of immunity are untrustworthy. And safety in exile becomes paramount. Enhancing programs like the Mo Ibrahim Prize, which grants former African leaders a nice stipend for transferring power peacefully, would make sense. As unsavory as it sounds, offering President Saleh a mansion in the Hamptons might be more effective use of democracy promotion money than funding civil society programs.

Eva Bellin focused her analysis on the decision of the security apparatus to repress its citizens. For Bellin, so long as the military is capable and willing of shooting civilians, authoritarian regimes will survive. She provided three variables to determine willingness to shoot: the size of the protests, the nature of the protests (peaceful or violent), and finally the professionalism of the military.

This analysis suggests that US assistance to foreign militaries could actually have a democratizing effect. While such assistance undoubtedly increases the capacity to repress, if it is executed in a manner that professionalizes the military (instills institutional pride, builds national identity, weakens patrimonial ties, etc), then the military will be less willing to sacrifice its self interests by shooting civilians in revolutionary moments. Coincidentally, we are working hard to professionalize militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon. This policy prescription is quite counterintuitive, as military assistance is usually considered an example of propping up authoritarian regimes.

Finally, among other topics, Lust identified the importance of considering the variable of time. Combined with Heydemann and Bellin's emphasis on the robustness of authoritarianism, we should consider the difference between promoting democratic evolution versus democratic revolution. Currently, we hope that minor changes over time will accrue and eventually lead to democratic systems. But if authoritarian regimes are in fact so adaptive and coercive, then maybe only revolutions can bring democracy in the Middle East. In that case, why waste resources on policies designed for evolutionary change?

Now I'm not saying these policy prescriptions are what Heydemann, Bellin and Lust would prescribe. Nor am I saying I think they are correct. In fact, I think some are flat wrong, and they are wrong because they are based on flawed understandings of why the Middle East is undemocratic. But that just proves the more general point: we need to understand the region before we understand how to democratize that region. So even though this event largely ignored policy prescriptions, it still was quite useful in learning how we might formulate policy in the future.