Rethinking Democracy Assistance

Yesterday I went to an event at GW on "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." The three speakers,  Steven Heydemann, Eva Bellin and Ellen Lust, have all been writing about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East for years. And unfortunately, they focused mainly on that question as opposed to pivoting to the supposed topic of the day: how the US can help more effectively support democratic reform in the region.

Nonetheless, their talks reflect the importance of understanding what's happening in the region as a prerequisite for formulating effective policy. While they did not explicitly address democracy promotion, their analyses imply certain policies, some of which would be quite unorthodox.

For example, Heydemann emphasized that it's not just the opposition that learns how to better agitate for their rights, but regimes also learn how to better repress their citizens. He calls this "upgrading authoritarianism," in which regimes can become "stronger, more flexible, and more resilient" over time. Specifically in the past few months, the leaders of countries like Yemen and Syria have seen the way Ben Ali and Mubarak have been treated and learned that: 1) more violence is needed 2) if I step down, I might end up in jail or worse.

Based on Heydemann's anlaysis, democracy promotion policy should look closely at the strategic calculus of these leaders to learn how to best coax them to implement actual reforms, or when necessary, step down. This means ICC investigations of Qaddafi are counterproductive. Promises of immunity are untrustworthy. And safety in exile becomes paramount. Enhancing programs like the Mo Ibrahim Prize, which grants former African leaders a nice stipend for transferring power peacefully, would make sense. As unsavory as it sounds, offering President Saleh a mansion in the Hamptons might be more effective use of democracy promotion money than funding civil society programs.

Eva Bellin focused her analysis on the decision of the security apparatus to repress its citizens. For Bellin, so long as the military is capable and willing of shooting civilians, authoritarian regimes will survive. She provided three variables to determine willingness to shoot: the size of the protests, the nature of the protests (peaceful or violent), and finally the professionalism of the military.

This analysis suggests that US assistance to foreign militaries could actually have a democratizing effect. While such assistance undoubtedly increases the capacity to repress, if it is executed in a manner that professionalizes the military (instills institutional pride, builds national identity, weakens patrimonial ties, etc), then the military will be less willing to sacrifice its self interests by shooting civilians in revolutionary moments. Coincidentally, we are working hard to professionalize militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon. This policy prescription is quite counterintuitive, as military assistance is usually considered an example of propping up authoritarian regimes.

Finally, among other topics, Lust identified the importance of considering the variable of time. Combined with Heydemann and Bellin's emphasis on the robustness of authoritarianism, we should consider the difference between promoting democratic evolution versus democratic revolution. Currently, we hope that minor changes over time will accrue and eventually lead to democratic systems. But if authoritarian regimes are in fact so adaptive and coercive, then maybe only revolutions can bring democracy in the Middle East. In that case, why waste resources on policies designed for evolutionary change?

Now I'm not saying these policy prescriptions are what Heydemann, Bellin and Lust would prescribe. Nor am I saying I think they are correct. In fact, I think some are flat wrong, and they are wrong because they are based on flawed understandings of why the Middle East is undemocratic. But that just proves the more general point: we need to understand the region before we understand how to democratize that region. So even though this event largely ignored policy prescriptions, it still was quite useful in learning how we might formulate policy in the future.

Israelis Boycott Turkish Coffee

Arabic news network Al Arabiya reports many Israeli restaurants have decided to boycott Turkish coffee. In addition, Israeli's national airline, El Al, will stop subsidizing vacations for their workers to popular Turkish destinations.

These developments are the latest indicators of the deteriorating relations between traditional allies Israel and Turkey. According to Michael Reynolds at the MESH blog, "The Turkey-Israeli strategic partnership is no longer in crisis, but has essentially ended."

In recent weeks, Turkey expressed its anger over the Gaza War by barring Israel from participating in a joint military exercise. Later, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman chastised Turkey for a new television drama that shows Israel soldiers murdering Palestinian children. Last week, Syria and Turkey signed several treaties that indicate a growing strategic partnership between the two countries - a trend none too comforting to Israelis. Finally this weekend, Prime Minister Netanyahu has questioned whether Turkey can act as an "honest broker" in mediating talks between Syria and Israel.

So what's the deal? At a recent event I attended at the United States Institute of Peace, Brookings expert Ömer Taşpınar cited two causes. One, the voice of the Turkish people has been amplified over the years, making the government more responsive to populist sentiment. The Turkish people, never fully convinced about their government's alliance with Israel, have voiced their anger forcefully over innocents killed during Israeli military operations. During a conversation this summer with a Turkish friend, I said in passing "Now that the Gaza War is over..." She immediately interjected angrily, "The war's not over! Palestinians are still suffering every day!"

Second, perhaps as a backlash over stalled E.U. ascension talks, the Turkey has witnessed a growing surge of nationalistic fervor. Turkey now seeks to become a regional power, solving the region's issues and developing ties with all of its neighbors. Towards this end, Turkey has sought to improve relations with its longtime rival Armenia. In addition, Turkish President Abdullah Gul boasted today that Turkey is among the "rare" countries that maintain good relations with both Israel and the Arab states.

That statement implies to me that, while relations are suffering right now, in the long run cooler heads will prevail in both Turkey and Israel. The countries share several essential strategic interests that require cooperation, especially in countering Iran's vision of establishing its own regional hegemony. The United States won't let them forget what's at stake. In fact, it appears President Obama may have already raised the issue of Israel to President Gul in a telephone call this weekend.

But for the near future, expect some grumpy, caffeine-starved Israelis in Tel Aviv's cafes.

(Un)Islamic Republic of Iran

The ideological fervor behind the Islamic Republic in Iran seems to be fading, especially since the June 12 elections. While we have always known Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad care more about staying in power than the people in Iran, we are now learning they also are willing to sacrifice the precepts of the Islamic revolution to maintain their rule. As Geneive Abdo argues, recent appointments of ultra hard-liners to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps reveal a growing reliance on the military to keep the Iranian people in check.

This past week, the regime hosted street demonstrations to display the prowess of the police forces. You can see some pictures here (h/t Tehran Bureau). Policewomen, garbed in veils to ensure modesty, break concrete slabs over their stomachs and ninja-chop stacks of wood. Most interestingly, the women are shown publicly touching men as they spar each other. Keep in mind, Iranian women can find themselves in trouble for letting a mere lock of hair fall carelessly from underneath their veil. So for the government to not only permit but to host demonstrations where women are in physical contact with men is truly amazing. It is one trivial but telling example of how militarism - and not revolutionary Islam - now upholds the Iranian regime.

As a side note, it is not uncommon for once ideologically driven regimes to forgo their founding principles in order to stay in power. Communist China is a good example (in some senses, they are now more capitalist than we are). And just last month, North Korea amended its constitution to formally expunge "Communism" from the text and declare Kim-Jong Il its official "Supreme Leader."