Trading Settlements for Gilad Shalit

Some of what I plan to post here will actually be op ed and letter to editor submissions that were not published. Here's one I wrote way back in October about trading a settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier imprisoned by Hamas.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu should publicly offer to extend the settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held hostage by Hamas. Whether Hamas says yes or no, Netanyahu will come out the winner.

Despite the best efforts of the Obama administration, the current round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has reached an impasse. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refuses to negotiate so long as Israel continues to build settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Netanyahu claims domestic politics precludes him from extending the freeze, especially after the Palestinians failed to negotiate until the waning weeks of the original freeze.

The Obama administration hasn’t given up hope yet. It has offered Netanyahu a package of incentives to reinstate the freeze while pressuring Abbas to acquiesce to some compromise less than a complete freeze. But neither side seems ready to budge.

Therefore, the ultimate success of these negotiations currently hinges upon Netanyahu’s willingness and ability to surmount right-wing opposition to extending the settlement freeze. For negotiations to continue, Netanyahu needs new sources of domestic support. More pessimistically, Netanyahu also needs a scapegoat should negotiations collapse.

A public offer to Hamas to exchange a settlement freeze for the release of Gilad Shalit would achieve both of those ends.

In the summer of 2006, Hamas militants crossed the Israel-Gaza border and kidnapped then-Corporal Shalit. Mounting international pressure, multiple military clashes, and several rounds of negotiations have all failed to bring Shalit home. Currently, Hamas demands the release of approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit’s freedom.

That is a tough pill to swallow for many Israelis, who balk at the large number of prisoners and fear that such a deal would encourage further kidnappings. But at the same time, the Gilad saga has resonated deeply within Israeli society. Nearly every Israeli household has some father, mother, son, or daughter serving in the military and can only too well imagine the tragedy that has befallen the Shalit family. If there is any cause that could rally Israelis to support a settlement freeze, it is the freedom of Gilad Shalit.

Plus, Israel has already shown a willingness to seek creative solutions with its offer to extend the freeze in exchange for Jonathan Pollard, the Israeli convicted of spying against the U.S.

Unfortunately, it is not clear Hamas would be interested in a Gilad-for-freeze deal. Through Gilad, they gain leverage over the Israeli government. It is unlikely Hamas would want to give up that leverage for the sake of a peace process sponsored by their Palestinian rivals. They much rather force Israel to release Hamas members from prison. Or just as likely, they might simply prefer to maintain a state of tension with Israel to build popular support for their armed resistance platform.

Yet Hamas would refuse the deal at its own peril. Palestinians desire an independent state above all else. The building of settlements precludes the realization of their aspirations in the most tangible of ways: the physical usurpation of the land of their future nation. Moreover, these negotiations represent the best chance for Palestinians to achieve statehood in the near-term.
Hamas would be left with a stark choice. Should they do what’s best for their organization and refuse the deal? Or should they do what’s best for Palestinians and release Shalit? Palestinians would be watching carefully to see where Hamas’ true interests lie.

Moreover, a Hamas refusal would allow Netanyahu to displace much of the blame for the negotiations collapsing. In this way, Netanyahu wins whether Hamas says yes or no. Either negotiations go forward or Hamas gets the blame.

This win-win situation works whether Netanyahu truly desires peace or not, a matter of contentious debate. Assuming Hamas would refuse the deal, Netanyahu could cynically make the offer to solely create a scapegoat that would obscure his own insincerity. If by some surprise Hamas does accept the deal, Netanyahu could easily find other obstacles to peace beyond settlement building.

For that reason, the United States should exert pressure to ensure that such an offer is extended with sincerity and that any resulting freeze is both comprehensive and durable. Moreover, the U.S. cannot allow such an offer to preclude other avenues that might allow talks to progress. President Obama must continue to think creatively about how the U.S. can prod, bribe, and compel the parties to return to the negotiating table. A trade of a settlement freeze for Gilad Shalit’s freedom is only one among many options.

Failed Iran Op Ed

I recently wrote this op-ed and submitted it to the Baltimore Sun. It was rejected. So, now it's posted here instead. For those who are interested, the historical background comes from this fascinating article by Muhammad Sahimi at Tehran Bureau

Americans have learned many things about Iran these past few months. We’ve learned of the brutality of the baton-wielding Basij and the courage of the Iranian citizens who bear the brunt of their blows. We’ve learned of the cruelty of Evin Prison’s interrogators and the perseverance of the victims who endure their torture. We’ve learned of the ruthlessness of the hollow regime in Tehran and the strength of the opposition who demand their fundamental rights.

We have also learned about the utter complexity of Iranian politics. Take, for example, Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, who Muhammad Sahimi at the Tehran Bureau calls “the power behind the scene” of the opposition movement.

The regime clearly wants to silence Khoeiniha. Yet given his impeccable revolutionary credentials, the regime cannot do so without revealing how ideologically hollow they have become. Khoeiniha served as one of Ayatollah Khomeini's most trusted advisers. Furthermore, it was Khoeiniha who gave approval to the students of the Office for Consolidation of Unity (OCU) to storm the American embassy on November 4, 1979. To this day, Khoeiniha proudly keeps a filing cabinet in his office that reads "Property of the General Services Administration" of the United States.

Most interestingly, two students on the OCU board opposed the decision to take over the American embassy. Instead, they argued that the students should target the Soviet Embassy (at this time, Communists were still influential throughout Iran). In an ironic twist of history, one of those dissenters was none other than current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

This history lesson should give pause to any American foreign policymaker. Iranian politics are incredibly complex, constantly evolving and frustratingly opaque. Even if we do have experts who understand its subtleties, and that's a big if, any nuanced analysis is likely lost as information is passed up the chain of command.

At a recent event on Capitol Hill, Brookings Institution expert Kenneth Pollack warned the audience that we must not try to meddle in internal Iranian affairs, especially given the difficulty in understanding all of its nuances. We simply don't understand how to intervene successfully. When we have tried in the past, such as supporting the Shah's coup in 1953, we only have laid the foundation for anti-Americanism, extremism and regime paranoia.

But at the same time, we cannot ignore the struggle for Iranian democracy as we negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program. No matter the checkered past of the opposition leaders, the Green Movement presents the best opportunity for a prosperous and stable Iran in the long-term, an Iran that will no longer poses a strategic threat to the United States and its allies.

Moving forward, U.S. policymakers should therefore follow three guidelines:

1. Listen to the Iranian people. None of the information above is news to the Iranian people. They know the history of their leaders and what implications those histories may entail. Where we are ignorant, they are knowledgeable. Where we are cumbersome, they are agile. Quite simply, they know what works and what doesn't. Admittedly, it will be sometimes difficult to determine what the Iranians want - they will often disagree and debate amongst themselves. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn't listen and learn as best we can.

2. Do no harm. Ultimately, this struggle belongs to the Iranians. They must answer the tough questions and take the bold actions. They have done so already and will continue to do so, as shown most recently by the protests on November 4th. We can help when it is clear our assistance is both needed and wanted. We must not rush policy for the appearance of solidarity, but rather we must carefully consider how our actions will impact the interests of the Iranian people. When the result is in doubt, doing less is better than doing harm.

3. Bolster institutions and processes, not personalities. It is exceedingly difficult to determine who in Iran deserves American support. It would be hard to explain why opposition leaders like Ayatollah Khoeiniha deserve our assistance, given his pedigree. Nor is his case special. Many of the opposition leaders, including Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, held high level government positions as the regime executed thousands of political prisoners in the 1980s. But even if we did find leaders deserving of support, it is unclear how the U.S. can substantively help them without risking their reputations as independent politicians free of foreign influence.

Instead, the U.S. should look to support efforts to strengthen the institutions and processes that uphold all healthy democracies - a free press, a thriving civil society, an independent judiciary, electoral safeguards and the rule of law. By bolstering Iranian democracy without elevating specific personalities, the U.S. can avoid most charges of meddling while exposing those who would deny the Iranian people their inalienable right of self-determination.

Rivals, Not Enemies

Per Laura Rozen at Politico, Ambassador John Limbert has been named the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran at the State Department. Thirty years ago, Limbert was taken hostage during the Tehran embassy takeover and held for fourteen months, much of it in solitary confinement. After his release, he continued to serve in the Foreign Service for 33 years and was awarded the Distinguished Service Award.

Given the next year will have serious implications for not only US-Iranian relations but the Middle East as a whole, it is obvious why State would want to bring Limbert back on board. As Rozen explains, "Limbert is one of the few U.S. diplomats to have actually served in Tehran and who speaks the language fluently."

And speak the langauge fluently he does. Not only is he a scholar of medieval Persian poetry, he employs pun and wordplay with ease. Take, for instance, this video of Limbert and Khamenei during the hostage crisis at the niacINsight blog. Limbert quips about the Iranian concept of "taarof" or hospitality, telling Khamenei: "Iranians are too hospitable to guests in their country, when we insist that we must be going, you tell us 'no, no, you must stay.'"

In another example, I recently attended a conference on Capitol Hill hosted by the National Iranian American Council in which Limbert participated. During his remarks, he made a pun in Farsi, sparking laughter amongst the Iranians in the room. The rest of us, wondering what just happened, chuckled quietly to not feel left out.

But his language skills, while impressive, are not as important as the analysis he'll bring to his office. At the NIAC conference, he emphasized three critical points. First, the U.S. must not narrowly focus on the nuclear issue, but instead must broaden the negotiations to focus on the issues Iranians care about as well. If we only demand our objectives and not listen to theirs, we will not succeed in achieving anything.

Second, he emphasized the importance of patience. During the hostage negotiations, the basic deal to release him and the other hostages was hammered out four months before the final release. But it is difficult to turn agreed principles into action. If the U.S. had imposed artificial deadlines on the Iranians, the negotiations would have failed and he may never have been freed.

Third, by seeking to engage the regime, President Obama has presented Khamenei with a real dilemma. For the past 30 years, American has been the Great Satan. But now that Obama has recast the US-Iran relationship as a rivalry and not a Manichean struggle between enemies, Khamenei is forced to rationalize his continued demonization of the U.S. Eventually, such efforts will discredit the regime.

The question is why did the State Department choose him? Is it only because he speaks the language and has experience? Or is it because of the policies he proffers? Obviously both are important, but it is unclear how well his voice will be heard over the din of the policy debate. But at the very least, I'm glad he'll be in the middle of the fray.