Morsi's Power Hunger

Yesterday was yet another depressing day for Egypt. With violence and anger escalating, the Egyptian president took to the podium. And like his predecessor before him, he squandered the opportunity to bridge the divides of his nation. Instead, he further exacerbated the situation with the familiar mix of meaningless concessions and meaningful threats. As Hafsa Halawa tweeted in response, “This is the worst-case scenario…This speech isn’t making me angry. It’s making me sad. So very sad.”

A slew of articles have been written these past few weeks declaring Morsi the new dictator of Egypt – or at least, the next dictator in the making. In an article entitled “Shame on Anyone Who Ever Thought Mohammad Morsi Was a Moderate,” Eric Trager argues the Muslim Brotherhood is inherently inimical to pluralism and democratic dialogue. In another article, Trager focuses specifically on “Morsi’s uncompromising demeanor.” In a similar vein, Khalil al-Anani examines Morsi’s “autocratic disposition” that has led him to take the “strongman route” to governing.

Clearly, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood generally have acted in severely troubling ways since the Egyptian revolution. They have broken promises about how many seats they would contend for in parliament, whether they would run for president, and who they would appoint in their administration. The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood proper, their purportedly independent Freedom and Justice Party, and the presidency remains as murky as ever. They have purged many of their members who have not adhered to the official line. And they seem to have a genuine disregard for the needs of both religious and political minorities. As Jeffrey Goldberg tweeted, “Morsi has made the transition from dissident to despot at an impressive rate of speed.” However, it is not clear that their actions reveal an inherently authoritarian disposition as Trager and al-Anani contend.

July 23rd Clashes

My friend and I were doing Arabic homework in a café in Zamalek – an upper class haven in Cairo - when the news came in. Violent clashes had broken out between Tahrir protesters and supporters of the ruling military council (SCAF). Protesters had marched from Tahrir to the SCAF headquarters to demonstrate peacefully , and they were met with violent resistance from stone-wielding civilians. We watched on TV as rocks and Molotov cocktails began to fly through the air, intermingled with the army’s live ammunition cracking over the heads of the demonstrators.

At the time of writing, reports are coming in that over 100 people have been injured, including the female presidential candidate Bothaina Kamel. I’m very worried the violence will escalate through the night. The last time there were clashes like this, over 1000 people were injured before the violence subsided. Some even are worrying that Tahrir Square itself may be in danger.

So how did we get here? Several developments in the past few weeks have made violence increasingly likely, if not inevitable.

First, the decreasing numbers of protesters present in Tahrir Square have made an attack more probable. When the sit-in began on July 8th, at least one hundred thousand people flooded into Tahrir. With the exception of the Salafists, every single political group and movement participated. But the unity and enthusiasm of July 8th have faded since then.

From the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood refused to stay for the sit-in, though some of its youth members, nonetheless participated unofficially. More recently, the opposition party al-Wafd withdrew from the sit-in as well, its leader oddly claiming the Tahrir protesters played no role in the revolution. As the sit-in dragged on ever longer, the excitement of the square faded and only a vanguard of revolutionaries remained. Protests of over 100,000 had diminished to a sit-in of 1000, if that.

With such a small showing, it would no longer be hard for the military council to portray the protesters as fringe radicals bent on chaos and clamp down on the protests without angering the general public.

Second, protesters in Tahrir have grown increasingly frustrated and angry. As I wrote before, the festival atmosphere on July 8th belied the day’s foundation of anger towards the regime and, for many, the SCAF. While the sit-in has achieved some of its objectives, it has not realized its most important demands. Nor does the SCAF seem prepared to bend much further anytime soon. Rather, the SCAF has escalated its rhetoric against the protests in recent days, with finger-pointing generals attacking key revolutionary groups. Such provocation raised the political temperature even higher. Running out of time as the fasting month of Ramadan approached, many protesters felt the time had come raise the stakes. In such an environment, even a minor provocation from the SCAF could lead to a quick, unwanted, and avoidable escalation. On both sides, there was plenty of tinder ready to ignite.

Finally, many Egyptians have become increasingly ambivalent to, and even hostile towards, the Tahrir sit-in. Some Egyptians have admittedly been mislead about the Tahrir sit-in, especially as Salafists painted the square as a den of sex and drugs – a description that regime remnants surely were happy to proliferate. But even those who support the revolution and its cause have started to feel greater ambivalence. As I wrote last week, many Egyptians who participated in the revolution now worry about the economy, security, and the fragmentation of society. Meanwhile, overzealous protesters made unnecessary enemies with some of the vendors in Tahrir Square in a misguided and short-lived attempt to remove them from the square. Without the clear support of the people, the Tahrir sit-in grew increasingly isolated and thereby vulnerable.

In the end, the SCAF’s military psychology took over tonight. They looked at the Tahrir protesters and saw a weakened and aggravated adversary. With their numbers diminished, their tempers flaring, and their support ebbing, the time was ripe for an attack. By marching on the SCAF headquarters, the protesters stumbled into a trap. The SCAF only had to rile up the locals with rumors of incoming marauders and watch the mayhem unfold. So they did.

The key question now is whether the violence will spur the silent majority back into action. During the first revolution, small bands of demonstrators suddenly ballooned into million-strong protests largely out of disgust at the violence unleashed by Mubarak’s security forces and thugs. Perhaps the SCAF has just made the same mistake.

But that seems unlikely. The waiters at my Zamalek café watched al-Arabiya intently for a minute as news of the battle trickled in. Then with a shrug one of them changed the channel to watch music videos. Collecting my things, I made my way back to my apartment to turn on the news and follow the clashes on Twitter. Passing my doorman, I asked him about the violence. He replied, “What clashes? There can’t be any clashes. The people and the army are one hand.”

UPDATE: If you want to read more about what happened last night, you should check out the Egyptian blogger Zeinobia's blog.

In Tahrir At Last

Since I arrived in Cairo on Wednesday, I’ve struggled over how much I should stick my nose in Egypt’s business. I am here to learn about the revolution, to fill in the context that mainstream media ignores and the complexity social media obscures. But at the same time, post-Mubarak Cairo can be a dangerous place where sensitivities abound – sensitivities that a foreigner like me can all too easily tread upon.

Today I had to make my first decision: should I go to the largest protests since the fall of Mubarak? Not a single Egyptian friend urged me to go to Tahrir. Most were just nervous for my safety out of an abundance of hospitality. Some flat out told me to stay at home. But as I sat in my apartment watching the protests on TV – as I have done from DC since January – I grew increasingly antsy. What’s the point of traveling all the way to Egypt to just watch TV? Before I knew it, I was in a cab on my way to Midan al-Tahrir.

Passing through the citizen checkpoint on Qasr al-Nil Bridge – the site of pitched battles between protesters and police during the revolution – I felt a chill run down my spine. Almost 1000 Egyptians died fighting for their freedom. Thousands more have been injured, imprisoned and tortured. All Egyptians have sacrificed for this revolution, which has accomplished so much and yet has so much more to do.

It is for their sake Egyptians have decided to descend upon Tahrir Square once more today. Mubarak may be gone, but his regime remains. Entering the square, I could hear the simple demands of the protesters. Al-shaab yureed tetheer al-nizam. The people want the cleansing of the regime. They chanted for justice, for accountability, and for the resignations of Mubarak’s lackeys.

Much of the protests were as I had seen on TV and social media. Tahrir definitely exudes a festival-like atmosphere, and I can see why protesting can not only be fun, but addictive. Families milled about as children got their faces painted. Vendors hawked revolutionary paraphernalia and delicious street food. Protesters rotated between chanting, singing, and forming discussion groups. Those with the funniest or most artistic signs beamed proudly as bystanders took pictures. One teenager scaled a massive lamp post to wave the Egyptian flag for a cheering crowd. When dignitaries from Al-Azhar arrived, the crowd parted to make way for the sheikhs to mount the stage.

But there are so many details that press coverage would miss or ignore. A seven year old kid collected trash while puffing on a cigarette nonchalantly. A group of calm protesters would roar suddenly when Al Jazeera cameras appeared and go quiet just as quickly when the cameras turned off. Would-be speakers on various stages quibbled over who would speak next. Off-message speakers were forced to give up their mics as the crowd shouted at them to Enzl or step down.

Although Egyptians have united today around a core set of demands, schisms were also obvious in the square. Various groups erected their own makeshift stages, each with their own sound systems that competed with their neighbors. At one point, the Muslim Brotherhood – which enjoyed both the largest stage and audience – began to sing Allahu Akbar, Bismillah (God is Greatest, in the name of God) over and over again. The adjacent Christians broke in with chants of “Muslims, Christians, we are one hand. Long live Egypt.” Each group then tried to drown out the other, the tension tangible.

The underlying sectarian tension belied the festival atmosphere. So too did the real anger felt towards the regime. The stage next to the Hardees featured a series of speeches by the mothers of martyrs killed during the revolution. Some thanked God for the honor of becoming a martyr family, some yelled angrily about the crimes of the regime, others just simply cried. At one point, thousands chanted in unison for the execution of those responsible for killing martyrs. One chant leader, sitting on his friend’s shoulders, riled up the crowd, his eyes and neck veins bulging in rage. At another stage, a small Mubarak effigy was hung by a noose, the puppet body clad in a prominent Star of David.

It is that underlying anger – when confronted with regime antics - that makes Tahrir such a volatile place. Incidents can quickly escalate. The past few weeks have seen a series of acts of random violence by regime thugs and explicit intimidation of press and foreigners. Today, I did not hear of any such problems – likely because the protests were so large that the government was helpless to do anything but let today run its course.

Tonight, however, may turn out to be an entirely different story. Many core revolutionaries hope resort to the tactics of the revolution and turn today’s protests into a full-scale sit-in. But the Muslim Brotherhood has announced it will not participate in such a sit-in, and the average protester may not be willing to take the risk of staying the night. If the numbers thin out, the government would have a free hand to unleash the thugs.

I left Tahrir with two questions. First, as I wrote about yesterday, will anything be achieved beyond a bunch of shouting-induced sore throats? Second, how will the 95% of Egyptians who did not participate interpret today’s events? Both answers will hinge on how tonight unfolds.

The May 27th Gamble

May 27th could prove the most important day for the Egyptian revolution since Mubarak's resignation. This Friday, a coalition of revolutionaries have called for a million-man protest. They hope to spark, in their own words, a second Egyptian revolution.

This confrontational strategy is fraught with risks. Of course, the protests will anger the military council ruling Egypt, which cares about stability above all else. But perhaps more worrisome, the protests could further fracture Egyptian society.

We all marveled at the stunning unity of the Egyptian people in Tahrir Square during the revolution. Young and old, Muslim and Christian, rich and poor, urban and rural all chanted together, "The people want the fall of the regime." But as many analysts warned, once those chants became reality, the unity would begin to disintegrate. So it has.

Since Mubarak's resignation, several fractures have become visible. The call for massive protests on May 27th could exacerbate all of them.

First, sectarian tensions between Christian and Muslims have bubbled over on several occasions. As Michael Hanna points out, these tensions "have deep roots in recent Egyptian history [and] may be the most urgent test of how much Egypt has actually changed since the fall of Hosni Mubarak." Violence has prompted some Christians to voice nostalgia for the security of the Mubarak era, and in a few extreme cases, they have even called for foreign intervention. For the first time, we've seen Christians protest separately from those demonstrating in Tahrir Square.

These tensions are even visible in the Egyptian-American community. A recent conference I attended devolved into a shouting match between Christians and Muslims before one well-respected community leader defused the situation with a timely joke.

While the May 27th protest leaders have called on all Egyptians, Muslim and Christian, to descend upon Tahrir Square, they oddly have not included anything concerning religious freedom and tolerance in their list of demands (in Arabic here). For many Christians (and Egypt's other religious minorities), silence on the issue implies acquiescence to the unacceptable status quo.


Second, the debate over the role of Islam in politics has also caused divisions within Egyptian society. Most visibly, Salafists have been behind much of the sectarian troubles in recent months. The Muslim Brotherhood, though it has condemned the violence, has not quelled fears about its ultimate intentions. Mixed messages abound. For example, even though the Brotherhood's new political party includes Christian leadership, it also plans to work closely with Salafi political parties in the upcoming elections.

The May 27th protests will have to recruit their million men and women without the help of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has refused to participate. As one of the best organized organizations in Egypt, the Brotherhood sees an interest in holding elections as soon as possible and therefore does not want any major disturbances to delay the electoral schedule.

Yet the Brotherhood also initially refused to officially participate in the January 25th revolution. If the protests gather momentum, they may change their mind about May 27th as well. Moreover, it's not clear they will be able to maintain their own unity. Just as they did in the January 25th revolutions, youth members of the movement may join the protests without official permission, further contributing to a generational divide within the organization. Finally, the May 27th protests may further split the interests of the estranged Brotherhood member who has declared his candidacy for president against the wishes of the leadership.

Third, different revolutionary priorities have also led to disagreement. On May 15th, a largely secular crowd protested in front of the Israeli embassy in commemoration of what they call the Nakba, or the "catastrophe" of the founding of Israel and the coerced migration of Palestinians. For many Egyptians, the protests and resulting crackdown was an unnecessary distraction from Egypt's tremendous internal problems. As the blogger Zeinobia put it, May 15th "was truly Nakba for all Egypt, no one won as everybody lost." That is not to say Palestine isn't important to Egyptians or to the Egyptian revolution, as this post by Hossam el-Hamalawy clearly shows. But rather, many simply feel now is not the right time to stir up yet another hornet's nest.

Instead, people like Wael Ghonim have urged the revolutionaries to focus on the economic conditions of the country. Underlying this argument is a valid concern that the revolution has lost touch with the needs and aspirations of the average Egyptian who cares more about bread than abstract political rights.

Tellingly, the May 27th organizers have placed the economy at the top of their agenda. However, their demands take a clear ideological turn to the left. They call for the establishment of a minimum and maximum wage, "the distribution of wealth to rescue the country from economic crisis," price controls, progressive tax schedules, and the prosecution of corrupt businessmen to recover ill-gained earnings.

Putting aside the question of what would objectively best serve Egypt's economy, the socialist slant of these demands may alienate certain segments of the Egyptian society who would otherwise participate on May 27th. For example, there is no mention of the need to promote economic growth through investment, trade and tourism or how protests would serve those ends. In addition, the question of foreign assistance will prove an obstacle to unity. As business magnate and newly-minted politician Naguib Sawiris in favor of such assistance tweeted recently, "busy writing the economic program of our party, not sure left wingers will like it!" But the thought of foreign assistance disgusts many Egyptians, such as Gigi Ibrahim who likened it to "shackles."

All of these issues - sectarianism, Islamism and revolutionary priorities - combine to form significant obstacles for the May 27th protests by draining possible sources of support. Unfortunate in-fighting between the revolutionaries, sparked by a mixture of jealousy and policy disagreement, has also hampered unity. But the greatest hurdle may simply be public fatigue. For months, Egyptians have lived on the edge. They were willing to balance on that edge to overthrow Mubarak. But with so many fault lines running through Egyptian society, it is unclear they are willing to continue to do so on May 27th. Nor is it clear that the demands of the May 27th protests can best be achieved on the street.

I am sure the May 27th organizers have carefully considered these questions, weighed the pros and cons, and decided to take a massive risk. They may succeed in sparking a second revolution that will bring true change to Egypt. Or they may drastically fail and even irrevocably tarnish the cadre of revolutionaries who led the way on January 25th. We will know Friday whether their gamble will pay off.

UPDATE: A blogger I cite above, Zeinobia, has translated the list of demands for May 27th and added her own commentary here.

The Muslim Brotherhood and Bin Laden

There has been some controversy over the Muslim Brotherhood reaction to the death of Osama Bin Laden. So I thought it'd be useful to translate their Arabic press release and explain what's going on.

Statement from the Muslim Brotherhood on the Assassination of Sheikh Osama Bin Laden (May 2, 2011)

The entire world and especially Muslims have experienced and been concerned by a malicious media campaign that conflates Islam with terrorism and describes Muslims as violent since connecting the events of September 11th to Al Qaeda.

Today, the American President announced that special forces from the American Marines successfully assassinated Osama Bin Laden, a woman, and children along with a number of companions. We now find ourselves facing a new situation.

The Muslim Brotherhood announces that they are against the use of violence in general and against the method of assassination. They instead favor fair trials of those accused of any crime.

The Muslim Brotherhood calls for the entire world and the Western world - both the people and especially its governments - to stop tying Islam with terrorism and to correct the false image of Islam that has been deliberately promoted for years.

The Muslim Brotherhood affirms the legitimacy of resistance against the foreign occupation of any country guaranteed by divine law and international conventions. To confuse legitimate resistance and violence against innocents has been the intention of the Zionist enemy in particular.

So long as occupation remains, so will legitimate resistance remain. America, NATO and the EU must quickly announce the end of the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq and recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Muslim Brotherhood calls for the US to refrain from intelligence operations against its detractors and to refrain from entering the internal affairs of any Arab or Muslim country.

Eric Trager read this statement and oddly concludes "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Sticks with Bin Laden." He goes on argue that this statement casts doubt whether the MB will "moderate" in post-revolution Egypt. As Marc Lynch tweeted, "this is a bizarre reading." But that hasn't stopped others to agree with Trager.

Let's address the statement point by point. First, there is no doubt many conflate Islam with terrorism. Now I don't think it's as pervasive as the MB implies, but no one can deny it exists.

Second, condemning assassination does not mean the MB has decided to "stick with Bin Laden" and refused to "moderate." Quite the opposite in fact. For years the MB has struggled to definitively prove it has internalized democratic principles and rejects terrorism. Their condemnation of assassination must be understood in that light. If it supports the killing of Bin Laden, why wouldn't it support the assassination of rival politicians in Egypt? Moreover, this sentiment reflects a broader Arab and Muslim feeling that while they are happy he is gone, they are uneasy in how he was dispatched. As a movement competing in elections in Egypt, we can't expect the MB or any other Egyptian party to stray from public opinion.

Third, what is extreme about asking for fair trials for criminals, even bloodthirsty terrorists? We hear the same arguments here in the U.S. all the time.

Fourth, the MB has always sought to separate "legitimate resistance" against "occupation" from Al-Qaeda style terrorism. Of course, for Israelis facing indiscriminate rocketfire or American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq, this distinction is entirely meaningless. But for the future of Egypt, it's hugely important. The Brotherhood views Al-Qaeda and like-minded individuals as a threat to its mantle as the primary Islamist movement in Egypt. It considers the AQ philosophy as an existential threat and treats the group accordingly.

Fifth, the demand for withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan and the recognition of the rights of Palestinians is not a unique MB demand. It's a near universal demand of Arabs and Muslims alike. The demand for the respect of sovereignty also reflects a broad societal concern over the history of colonialism and leadership pliant to foreign interests. The important question is not one of ends, but means. It's hard to criticize the MB for demanding such core planks of their political platform in a press release. The more important question is whether the MB will gain enough influence to fundamentally alter Egyptian foreign policy, and even more uncertain, whether it would choose to do so even if it did gain that capacity.

Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood is difficult enough. In fact, it's not even clear that the Muslim Brotherhood understands itself. Yet there's no doubt that hysteria over mundane press releases only makes the job harder.

Sayyid Qutb and Jihad

Earlier this week, the Washington Post ran an article by Lorenzo Vidino on "Five myths about the Muslim Brotherhood." Here's an unpublished letter to the editor I wrote in response:

In “Five myths about the Muslim Brotherhood” (3/4/11), Lorenzo Vidino contends Sayyid Qutb “opted for violence” and has “inspired jihadists worldwide.” While true, these observations require some context.


After years of torture in Egyptian prison, Qutb published his political and religious treatise Milestones. While he vigorously defends the Islamic obligation of “jihad of the sword,” Qutb also argues a true Islamic society must fulfill that obligation. Importantly, Qutb laments that no such society exists. Thus as a first step, a “vanguard” of true believers must leave unbelieving society in order to study the Qur’an and determine how such a society can be formed.

In short, Qutb believed the times call for religious introspection, not violence. Yet there is no question his argument has been misconstrued by countless violent extremists, cherry picking Qutb’s arguments just as they cherry pick the Qur’an itself.

Some of the blame for this confusion lies with Qutb himself. Not long after he published Milestones, he was implicated in a conspiracy to overthrow the Egyptian regime. While his exact role is not clear, the Egyptian court misinterpreted Milestones just as modern violent extremists do today – twisting Qutb’s arguments as an immediate call for jihad.

Playing Mubarak's Games

Earlier this week, an Egyptian opposition blogger was abducted, beaten, and left in the streets to bleed. Today, the Egyptian government suddenly released from prison (Arabic) a key leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such is the arbitrary brutality of the Mubarak regime.

The blogger, Kareem el-Shae'r, moderates the Free Egypt blog and is a member of the el-Ghad (Tomorrow) party. The liberal, secular el-Ghad party is led by Ayman Nour, who mounted a historic and unsuccessful campaign against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt's first mutli-party presidential election in 2005. Nour was jailed for his chutzpah after the election on trumped up charges, only to be finally released this year. Beyond imprisoning Nour, the regime has sought to discredit and intimidate the el-Ghad party, as exemplified by the beating of el-Shae'r.*

The Muslim Brotherhood leader, Dr. Abdel Moneim Abul Futouh, serves as a member of the MB's Guidance Council. Currently, the MB is split between two ideological camps: a conservative faction that favors cultivating Islam within the organization and a reformist camp that seeks greater political participation outside the organization. Abul Futouh heads the reformist camp, and for that reason, was jailed by the government as a threat to the regime.

There is inconsistent tendency amongst some Western observers to criticize Mubarak for repressing secular democrats such as Ayman Nour while ignoring the offenses committed against Islamist opposition figures like Abul Futouh.

On some emotional level, our inconsistency makes sense. We understandably empathize with people who share our secular, liberal values. In turn, it is harder to commiserate with adherents to political Islam, an ideology we Americans find foreign and even threatening. But we must remember, repression is repression. We should be repulsed by the methods of repression, not its victims.

In fact, President Mubarak hopes that we distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' repression. For 28 years, he has painted himself as our only option in Egypt. He claims Islamists pose a mortal threat and the secularists are too weak to stop their spread. Therefore, we have no choice but to support his reign as our indispensable ally.

But it's a tricky game he plays. For one, he doesn't explain why the secular opposition is so weak (that's because he's the primary reason). And two, he purposefully paints the Muslim Brotherhood as violent-prone zealots. To be fair, some of their members are nothing short of unsavory. But there are other Brothers, such as Abul Futouh, who represent a moderate Islamist voice.

Except we're not listening. Despite Mubarak's fearmongering, the reformist camp within the Muslim Brotherhood represents some of Egypt's most fervent democrats. For example, Brotherhood blogger Abdel-Monem Mahmoud (who has also spent time in jail) writes:

We have an established principle in Islam which is equivalent to democracy — it’s Shura. This means that we, as young MBs, firmly believe that the only way we can come to power is through ballot boxes. And if we came to power and didn’t live up to the electorate’s expectations, we would be removed from power also through ballot boxes. We will not remain in power for ever, or abuse it.

With such a powerful affirmation of democracy, it's no wonder Mubarak fears the reformist camp in the Muslim Brotherhood just as much, if not more, than the secular opposition. It is a wonder, however, why the U.S. buys into Mubarak's games. If we can talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan and Sunni militias in Iraq - groups that actively seek to kill our troops - why can't we talk to the non-violent Muslim Brotherhood? What do we have to fear from the likes of Abul Futouh and Monem?

*I'm not aware of any physical proof the regime was responsible for the beating, but it's a safe bet they were involved somehow.

Shoulda Put a Ring on It

Last week at my job, I was reading the State Department’s annual human rights report for Egypt when I came across a depressing study.

A survey by the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (ECWR) found 83 percent of Egyptian women and 98 percent of foreign women in the country have been sexually harassed and half reported they endure harassment on a daily basis. According to the State Department’s report, “women reported men staring inappropriately at their bodies, touching them inappropriately, making sexually explicit comments, and stalking them.” Furthermore, the ECWR found that only 2.4 percent of Egyptian women and 7.5 percent of foreign women decide to seek help from the police. Worse yet, some police officers reportedly mocked or harassed the women brave enough to come forward.

Last week when I wondered whether I was safer living in Cairo or here in DC, I was asking the question as a guy. For women living in Egypt, the situation is entirely different, sometimes even scary. Not one of my female friends escaped sexual harassment. The longer I lived in Cairo, the better I became at staring down sketch balls and using my body as a shield against would-be gropers on the sidewalk. One of my friends, fed up with the constant badgering, clocked a guy over the head with a bag of bread. Lesson learned? Probably not.

So why is sexual harassment so pervasive? There are a few reasons. The first results from the perfect storm of conservative values, marriage and unemployment. For most Egyptians, sex before marriage is taboo (but it does happen). Meanwhile, Egyptian culture dictates that a man cannot marry until he can sustain himself and his would-be family. Normally this would not present a large problem, but because Egypt suffers from overwhelming unemployment, men often cannot marry until their late 20s or early 30s. Thus, young Egyptians constantly struggle to maintain their outward piety while restraining their inevitable internal urges. In the process, sexual tension is released in unhealthy ways.

But this phenomenon only helps explain why unmarried Egyptian men might sexually harass women, but unfortunately they are not the only culprits. Therefore, a second factor is the cultural acceptance of sexual harassment. If you grow up seeing your father sexually harass women, you’re likely going to do it too. And if you start doing it while you’re young, you’ll likely do it for life – and eventually become the father who serves as the bad example for the next generation.

Furthermore, Egyptian society has yet witnessed a women’s emancipation movement as we saw in the West. But that doesn’t mean one is impossible. It was only a few decades ago that sexual harassment was rampant in the United States, as any episode of Mad Men demonstrates. Currently, plenty of Egyptian women are standing up and powerfully asserting their rights.

This implicit endorsement of sexual harassment by Egyptian society also helps explain why the government hasn’t been responsive to the women who choose to stand up against their assailants. After all, an Egyptian police office is often little more than a bunch of bored men smoking cigarettes in a hot, crowded room. But just as women are standing up for their rights, the government has also begun to (slowly) come around. While there is no law specifically prohibiting sexual harassment, the government has prosecuted cases under the statute called "Public Exposure and the Corruption of Morals." In the first case of its kind, a man was sentenced to three years of hard labor last year after he groped a woman on the bus.

Finally, foreign women face additional harassment for two reasons. For one, sexual harassers don’t need to worry that the victim’s Uncle Ahmed will come seeking retribution the next day. There’s no fear of shame. Second, there is a pervasive misunderstanding about Western morals. Namely, a lot of Egyptians think we have none. For many Egyptians, America is best exemplified by The Hills, Lady Gaga and Las Vegas, not Seventh Heaven, Taylor Swift and Birmingham, Alabama. A recent concert by Beyonce stirred incredible controversy in Egypt, with the Muslim Brotherhood calling it an “insolent sex party.” This misunderstanding of Western culture leads to unrealistic and unhealthy expectations about Western women in general. But if Egyptian men only listened to Beyonce’s lyrics, they would know “you shoulda put a ring on it” first.

While sexual harassment currently poses an incredible problem for women in Egypt, there is reason to hope things will improve. As the indigenous women’s rights movement gains steam, as the government grows more responsive, and as increased cultural exchange between Egypt and the West helps erase damaging stereotypes, the cultural acceptance for sexual harassment will begin to wither. And none too soon.

Let Them Wear Veils

The Grand Imam of Egypt's al-Azhar University, Sheikh Mohammad Sayyed Tantawi, recently told a female student to remove her niqab (a veil that covers the face) during a lecture, ostensibly because he had trouble hearing her. After he faced outrage from conservative Muslims, Sheikh Tantawi went ahead and banned the niqab from the university. Now, a group of Egyptian MPs, lawyers and human rights group have sued the Sheikh to reverse the decision.

The New Republic's Marty Peretz took this development as an opportunity to blast President Obama for his speech in Cairo, where the President said, "I reject the view of some in the West that a woman who chooses to cover her hair is somehow less equal." According to Peretz, "President Obama's indiscriminate endorsement of these curtaining contraptions is an intrusion into an active debate in the Muslim world, a reckless intrusion." Furthermore, Peretz suggests Sheikh Tantawi's decision is a "retort to Obama's intrusion."

I have to disagree on this one. President Obama sought to heal the relationship between the U.S. and the Muslim world in Cairo. For too long that relationship has been governed by mutual fear, instead of the "mutual interest and mutual respect" President Obama seeks to cultivate. Given Obama's purpose in Cairo and the millions of Muslim Americans the President represents, he has every right to speak about the veil. After all, why wouldn't the President speak about America's fundamental values of democracy, liberty and, yes, religious tolerance?

Part of the process of ameliorating our relationship must begin with the recognition that the veil is a legitimate symbol of Muslim piety. Many Muslim women choose to wear the veil, in the exact way many Orthodox Jews choose to wear kippot. There is no moral difference. However, there are certainly Muslim women who are forced to wear the veil against their will. Clearly, this is unacceptable and the U.S. must push for their right to dress as they please.

While Peretz brags about how many books he's read on the topic, he clearly hasn't spoken to many Muslim women. When I attended President Obama's speech at Cairo University (Peretz mistakenly says the speech took place at al-Azhar), it was obvious to me how excited the Muslim women were to hear the President's support for the veil. The comment drew some of the loudest applause of the entire speech. Nor were the women all conservative Muslims. Roughly half were students of the secular Cairo University, while many more women included Egypt's pop singers, movie stars and socialites (not exactly known for their religiosity).

Furthermore, it's outlandish to think Sheikh Tantawi would make such a fundamental decision only to retort the American president, as Peretz dubiously claims. After criticizing President Obama for inserting himself into an internal Muslim debate, Peretz oddly minimizes the validity of that debate with such an accusation. In addition, while al-Azhar University is considered one of the premier institutions of Sunni thought, it simultaneously carries a stigma of too closely following the Egyptian government line. It is impossible to understand the niqab ban without considering the long-lasting struggle between the Egyptian regime and Islamism. Just last week the Egyptian government detained 24 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading Islamist opposition group.

When Westerners like Peretz fixate on the veil while discussing women's rights, they do little to help real Muslim women. In fact, they only obfuscate the real problems Muslim women face every day, like economic inequality and insufficient education. That is the ultimate tragedy of arguments like the one Peretz lays out. Out of a desire to help, he only hurts the cause.

To see what real Muslim women are like, check out this photo album of Saudi women from Time Magazine and read this article by Sumbul Ali-Karamali about a recent Muslim women's rights conference in Malaysia. And if you're really interested, I wrote a comment to that article as well.