End of Poverty and Islam

In his latest op ed, Nick Kristof gives a good argument why Islam is neither the problem nor the solution for the Middle East's economic woes. The article hinges upon a new book by Timur Kuran that shows how specific Islamic legal institutions hindered economic growth. I haven't read the book yet, so I'll focus on Kristof. While he gets the conclusion right, the framing of his argument is incomplete.

He begins with an obvious observation: the Middle East has fallen behind economically from the West. Many often assume that this difference must be caused from something specific about the Middle East. Somehow, something, at some time, went wrong in the region.

Because Islam is the most salient characteristic of the Middle East, it often gets blamed. Kristof rightly dismisses that argument. If Islam were the problem, it's hard to explain why the Middle East used to flourish economically. Moreover, the economic effects of religion varies over time - not only because the economic and political environment changes, but also because religion itself evolves.

But what gets lost in that debate is that perhaps nothing went wrong in the Middle East, but rather, something went right in the West. As Jeffrey Sachs shows in The End of Poverty, standards of living were relatively similar on a global level only a few hundred years ago. But starting with the agricultural revolution, Europe began to shoot ahead. A small growth percentage advantage per year accumulated over several centuries, transforming a small discrepancy into a yawning schism.

The relevant questions are therefore what did Europe do right? Why has it taken the Middle East so long to follow suit? And perhaps the most difficult: are there other ways of getting things right?

None of this suggests Kristof comes to the wrong conclusions. In fact, I think he's completely right. It's just a matter of framing the argment differently.

Nitpicking Egypt's Constitutional Amendments

A committee appointed by the military council in charge in Egypt recently released several proposed amendments to the constitution. They will be voted on by the people within the next few weeks. For a full review, check out Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne's piece here. For this blog, I'm going to focus on one of the proposed changes: Article 189.

Originally, it was expected that this committee would propose changes to the constitution essential for fair elections, elections would be held for parliament and then president, and finally the newly elected officials would take a more thorough look at how to change the constitution more broadly (or write an entirely new one). The proposed Article 189 changes that plan.

Instead of mandating further constitutional changes after elections, it instead offers a procedure for how and when a new constitution can be written and adopted. Specifically, either the president or a majority in both houses of parliament can vote in favor of a new constitution. If that vote passes, parliament forms a 100 member constituent assembly to draft a new constitution to be voted upon by the people within 6 months.

If this measure passes, notice that it'll be easier to change the constitution in Egypt than it is to pass a law in the United States. This is a problem. Constitutions are supposed to act as the bedrock of politics, stable enough to provide security, flexible enough to ensure relativity. That's why after over two centuries, we've only amended our constitution 27 times. Of those, 10 were added simultaneously with ratification and two cancel each other out. So practically, we've only passed 15 amendments that stuck.

Yet if Article 189 passes, it'll be far too easy to amend the Egyptian constitution, defeating its purpose of providing political stability. Instead, with every shift in of the political winds, the constitution will be at threat. The temptation to seek amendments to gain political advantage will always be lurking behind every legislative debate and electoral challenge.

Now admittedly, it is likely the committee proposed Article 189 with the intention of making constitutional change easy the first time around, expecting the article to be removed in the next round of amendments. Practically, this plan makes sense as a political compromise in a time of immense uncertainty.

But here's the problem. Democracy isn't just about institutions and processes. It's a deeply-engrained understanding that a government serves its people. While not all democracies have constitutions, all democracies understand that a contract between people and government form the foundation of politics. The Egyptian constitution should outline that social contract and give life to its budding democracy. Adding amendments to that fundamental contract with the intention that they should be removed when convenient is not exactly an auspicious start.

It sets a bad precedent. Moreover, it echoes the worst of its antecedents. Mubarak lasted for nearly three decades by creating what political scientists call a liberalizing autocracy. Essentially, he set up all the bells and whistles of democracy - constitutions, elections, parliaments, etc - while squashing any force that truly portended democratic values. Mubarak's democracy was a sham democracy. Mubarak's constitution was a sham constitution. It helped him stay in power, and when it didn't, he changed it to keep him in power. After Mubarak forced through several devastating amendments in 2007, some government websites failed to even bother updating their websites.

That is what the constitution was worth in the old Egypt. In the new Egypt, a constitution must mean so much more. It must not only capture the organic spirit of Tahrir, but also organize that spirit into a workable and stable politics. By proposing Article 189 that is not intended to last, the committee has focused too keenly on the momentarily pragmatic at the expense of an enduring ideal.

I recognize I'm nitpicking here. There are so many things to worry about in Egypt right now. Amendment 189 is far down on that list. But this is the future Egyptian constitution we're talking about here. It should be nitpicked.

Twitter and the Egyptian Revolution

While the last post was a failed op ed submission, here's one that actually was published in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette! I argue that a lot of people have focused on the role of social media in the Egyptian revolution, but not enough attention has been given to how social media create transnational links between users. With so many serious people writing serious articles about Egypt, I took a more personal tone about my experiences following Egypt's democratic revolutionaries.

http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11044/1124806-109.stm

Trading Settlements for Gilad Shalit

Some of what I plan to post here will actually be op ed and letter to editor submissions that were not published. Here's one I wrote way back in October about trading a settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an IDF soldier imprisoned by Hamas.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu should publicly offer to extend the settlement freeze in exchange for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held hostage by Hamas. Whether Hamas says yes or no, Netanyahu will come out the winner.

Despite the best efforts of the Obama administration, the current round of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has reached an impasse. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refuses to negotiate so long as Israel continues to build settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Netanyahu claims domestic politics precludes him from extending the freeze, especially after the Palestinians failed to negotiate until the waning weeks of the original freeze.

The Obama administration hasn’t given up hope yet. It has offered Netanyahu a package of incentives to reinstate the freeze while pressuring Abbas to acquiesce to some compromise less than a complete freeze. But neither side seems ready to budge.

Therefore, the ultimate success of these negotiations currently hinges upon Netanyahu’s willingness and ability to surmount right-wing opposition to extending the settlement freeze. For negotiations to continue, Netanyahu needs new sources of domestic support. More pessimistically, Netanyahu also needs a scapegoat should negotiations collapse.

A public offer to Hamas to exchange a settlement freeze for the release of Gilad Shalit would achieve both of those ends.

In the summer of 2006, Hamas militants crossed the Israel-Gaza border and kidnapped then-Corporal Shalit. Mounting international pressure, multiple military clashes, and several rounds of negotiations have all failed to bring Shalit home. Currently, Hamas demands the release of approximately 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit’s freedom.

That is a tough pill to swallow for many Israelis, who balk at the large number of prisoners and fear that such a deal would encourage further kidnappings. But at the same time, the Gilad saga has resonated deeply within Israeli society. Nearly every Israeli household has some father, mother, son, or daughter serving in the military and can only too well imagine the tragedy that has befallen the Shalit family. If there is any cause that could rally Israelis to support a settlement freeze, it is the freedom of Gilad Shalit.

Plus, Israel has already shown a willingness to seek creative solutions with its offer to extend the freeze in exchange for Jonathan Pollard, the Israeli convicted of spying against the U.S.

Unfortunately, it is not clear Hamas would be interested in a Gilad-for-freeze deal. Through Gilad, they gain leverage over the Israeli government. It is unlikely Hamas would want to give up that leverage for the sake of a peace process sponsored by their Palestinian rivals. They much rather force Israel to release Hamas members from prison. Or just as likely, they might simply prefer to maintain a state of tension with Israel to build popular support for their armed resistance platform.

Yet Hamas would refuse the deal at its own peril. Palestinians desire an independent state above all else. The building of settlements precludes the realization of their aspirations in the most tangible of ways: the physical usurpation of the land of their future nation. Moreover, these negotiations represent the best chance for Palestinians to achieve statehood in the near-term.
Hamas would be left with a stark choice. Should they do what’s best for their organization and refuse the deal? Or should they do what’s best for Palestinians and release Shalit? Palestinians would be watching carefully to see where Hamas’ true interests lie.

Moreover, a Hamas refusal would allow Netanyahu to displace much of the blame for the negotiations collapsing. In this way, Netanyahu wins whether Hamas says yes or no. Either negotiations go forward or Hamas gets the blame.

This win-win situation works whether Netanyahu truly desires peace or not, a matter of contentious debate. Assuming Hamas would refuse the deal, Netanyahu could cynically make the offer to solely create a scapegoat that would obscure his own insincerity. If by some surprise Hamas does accept the deal, Netanyahu could easily find other obstacles to peace beyond settlement building.

For that reason, the United States should exert pressure to ensure that such an offer is extended with sincerity and that any resulting freeze is both comprehensive and durable. Moreover, the U.S. cannot allow such an offer to preclude other avenues that might allow talks to progress. President Obama must continue to think creatively about how the U.S. can prod, bribe, and compel the parties to return to the negotiating table. A trade of a settlement freeze for Gilad Shalit’s freedom is only one among many options.

Ibn Larry Round Two

After a long hiatus, I've decided to start blogging again. Previously, I tried to add new content daily. Unfortunately, I don't have the time to try that again. Instead, I'll post somewhat hapazardly (when I get randomly inspired, when I read something for class that I want to share, etc).

So here we go: Ibn Larry Round Two.