Immunity for Saleh

There is currently a debate over whether the US should have given Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh a visa to receive medical treatment. A lot of folks who know Yemen better than me say it was a mistake. But Dana Stuster, who also knows Yemen better than me, just published this piece arguing it was the right move.

Stuster contends that while the GCC deal is bad (it gave him immunity before he actually left power) and while the decision might anger Yemenis protesting in the streets, ultimately giving Saleh a visa makes sense because the US still needs him. Yes, he is on his way out the door, but he still has his foot stuck in the door jam. We need to convince him to kindly move it. And that means staying on his good side by allowing him medical treatment in the States.

Lessons of January 28th

Today is the one year anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. Yes, the protests began on January 25th. But it was on January 28th that a minority of protesters ballooned into a majority of revolutionaries. Exactly one year ago, protesters collided with security forces all across Egypt, but one clash in particular has especially engrained itself in my mind: the battle of Qasr al-Nil Bridge.

At this time last year, waves of protesters crashed and crashed again upon the seemingly immovable security forces on Qasr al-Nil. For hours, the battle lines went back and forth, but it seemed for certain that the protesters would eventually be turned back. But then the improbable happened. The protesters actually won. And those waves that once crashed ineffectively against the security forces began to flood Tahrir Square. They would not leave until Mubarak fell.

Rethinking Democracy Assistance

Yesterday I went to an event at GW on "Democracy Promotion in the Middle East." The three speakers,  Steven Heydemann, Eva Bellin and Ellen Lust, have all been writing about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East for years. And unfortunately, they focused mainly on that question as opposed to pivoting to the supposed topic of the day: how the US can help more effectively support democratic reform in the region.

Nonetheless, their talks reflect the importance of understanding what's happening in the region as a prerequisite for formulating effective policy. While they did not explicitly address democracy promotion, their analyses imply certain policies, some of which would be quite unorthodox.

For example, Heydemann emphasized that it's not just the opposition that learns how to better agitate for their rights, but regimes also learn how to better repress their citizens. He calls this "upgrading authoritarianism," in which regimes can become "stronger, more flexible, and more resilient" over time. Specifically in the past few months, the leaders of countries like Yemen and Syria have seen the way Ben Ali and Mubarak have been treated and learned that: 1) more violence is needed 2) if I step down, I might end up in jail or worse.

Based on Heydemann's anlaysis, democracy promotion policy should look closely at the strategic calculus of these leaders to learn how to best coax them to implement actual reforms, or when necessary, step down. This means ICC investigations of Qaddafi are counterproductive. Promises of immunity are untrustworthy. And safety in exile becomes paramount. Enhancing programs like the Mo Ibrahim Prize, which grants former African leaders a nice stipend for transferring power peacefully, would make sense. As unsavory as it sounds, offering President Saleh a mansion in the Hamptons might be more effective use of democracy promotion money than funding civil society programs.

Eva Bellin focused her analysis on the decision of the security apparatus to repress its citizens. For Bellin, so long as the military is capable and willing of shooting civilians, authoritarian regimes will survive. She provided three variables to determine willingness to shoot: the size of the protests, the nature of the protests (peaceful or violent), and finally the professionalism of the military.

This analysis suggests that US assistance to foreign militaries could actually have a democratizing effect. While such assistance undoubtedly increases the capacity to repress, if it is executed in a manner that professionalizes the military (instills institutional pride, builds national identity, weakens patrimonial ties, etc), then the military will be less willing to sacrifice its self interests by shooting civilians in revolutionary moments. Coincidentally, we are working hard to professionalize militaries in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon. This policy prescription is quite counterintuitive, as military assistance is usually considered an example of propping up authoritarian regimes.

Finally, among other topics, Lust identified the importance of considering the variable of time. Combined with Heydemann and Bellin's emphasis on the robustness of authoritarianism, we should consider the difference between promoting democratic evolution versus democratic revolution. Currently, we hope that minor changes over time will accrue and eventually lead to democratic systems. But if authoritarian regimes are in fact so adaptive and coercive, then maybe only revolutions can bring democracy in the Middle East. In that case, why waste resources on policies designed for evolutionary change?

Now I'm not saying these policy prescriptions are what Heydemann, Bellin and Lust would prescribe. Nor am I saying I think they are correct. In fact, I think some are flat wrong, and they are wrong because they are based on flawed understandings of why the Middle East is undemocratic. But that just proves the more general point: we need to understand the region before we understand how to democratize that region. So even though this event largely ignored policy prescriptions, it still was quite useful in learning how we might formulate policy in the future.

Woman Divorces over Gitmo Nickname

According to Al Arabiya, a Saudi woman has filed for divorce after discovering her husband stored her name in his cell phone as "Guantanamo." The husband claimed he stored the name to protect her identity, in case prying eyes might learn her number when she called.

Such nicknaming is apparently common practice for Saudi husbands, but most men choose less offensive names for their wives. However, one man interviewed, Khaled Omar, said he stored his wife as "salary" because "she has no mercy when it comes to spending."

So what do we learn from this?

For one, men do stupid things no matter where they're from. And then they get caught. Two, women don't like it when they're compared to an infamous prison that denies basic due process to some of the world's most dangerous terrorists. But, if you trust Mr. Omar, they do like shopping (I would add that most Gulf Arabs love shopping, not just the women).

But on a more serious point, the article notes the woman, who is currently 30 years old, has been married for 17 years. In other words, she was married at the age of 13. Yet for Al Arabiya, this uncomfortable fact is not worth mentioning.

Child marriage is a persistent problem in Saudi Arabia, as well as some other countries in the region. Just last month, a 12 year old Yemeni girl died during childbirth. In Saudi Arabia specifically, several high profile cases of child marriage have sparked debate within the Kingdom. In one case earlier this year, a judge annulled a marriage between an 8 year old girl and a 50 year old man. A strengthening women's movement and increasingly assertive press have begun to highlight such egregious cases.

Now, the Saudi government is considering setting a minimum age for marriage at 18 years, but has faced opposition from powerful, conservative religious leaders. Importantly, Saudi Arabia is a party to the Convention on the Rights of Child, a legally binding international treaty protecting the rights of minors. Yet, the country has been slow in meeting the convention's provisions.

While Islam is often used to justify child marriage by conservatives, it is not inherently an Islamic practice. There is currently an intense, internal debate about when marriage should be considered appropriate. For example, take a look at this article about child marriages in Malawi and the religious argument it sparks, with both sides citing religious sources.

One of the main points of contention is the Prophet Mohammed's marriage to one of his wives, Aisha, who was likely only nine years old when the marriage was consummated. Many Muslims argue that morality evolves with history. Therefore, what was acceptable in 7th century Arabia may no longer be acceptable in the 21st century. But some conservative Muslims, who believe the Prophet's life set an eternal exemplar of righteousness, argue that Islamic morality was perfected in the 7th century and will never change. Thus if Mohammed married a child, it is moral to do so now.

The debate over polygamy follows a similar structure. Over the course of his lifetime, Mohammed married eleven women. However, the Qur'an also clearly states that a man should never have more than four wives at one time and can only marry additional wives if he can manage to treat them all equally and fairly. Importantly, many men in the Old Testament also had multiple wives, but years ago Judaism and Christianity eliminated polygamy as modern morality evolved. Now, Islam is currently undergoing a similar process, but the answer is far from settled.